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Intrusion Detection has emerged as a powerful component of network security 
systems.  A wide range of hardware and software components exist to meet most basic 
security needs on all platforms.  These systems log system usage that could be considered 
as a breach of security in many networks.  However, signature based intrusion detection 
systems have one catastrophic downfall, in that the number of alerts being logged can 
quickly outgrow the amount of resources necessary to investigate this anomalous 
behavior.  This thesis explores the use of a fuzzy logic based analysis engine that gives an 
overall threat level of an intrusion detection sensor, prioritizing alerts that are the most 
threatening.  This application gives security personnel a launching point to determine 
where security holes exist and a snapshot of the threats that exist in a system.   
 The fuzzy logic system is based on a set of membership functions that define 
certain metrics from an alert dataset and a set of rules that determine a threat level based 
on the defined metrics.  This application functions as a proof of concept prototype for an 
administrative tool that can analyze multiple sensors across multiple networks and give a 
reasonable output of the threat level across a series of intrusion detection sensors on a 
network.  Initial testing indicates promising performance results for testing the threat 
level of a remote sensor using this methodology.   
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
 
In an age where the amount of information being stored and accessed is growing 
rapidly, the need for secure environments becomes more than an academic exercise.  In 
an attempt to increase the speed of service, more and more businesses are turning toward 
digital solutions.  These solutions can store medical data, control ballast mechanisms on 
ships, and operate a dizzying array of other objects that people use in their day-to-day 
lives.  In these critical systems, a secure environment is a fundamental need to ensure 
data integrity and public acceptance of the system.   
 Intrusion detection systems are a major component of securing any network.  
Analyzing information on the network layer is imperative for realizing and recovering 
from security breaches.  Most research until now has focused on creating a better 
intrusion detection system.  Reducing the number of false positives and false negatives 
has been of the utmost concern.  The focus of the problem at this point shifts toward 
finding an intermediate solution until a perfect solution can be found. 
 Robust, open-source enterprise level applications exist that can give an extremely 
high number of alerts; these alerts can take a vast amount of time to analyze and do not 
give an adequate level of threat for a system or network.  This document discusses the 
feasibility of an analysis engine residing on the application layer that uses fuzzy logic to 
determine a threat level.  The application in question is designed to be portable, scalable, 
and intuitive.  The application is described in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, with 
preliminary research shown in chapter 2.  Lastly, the testing, analysis, conclusions, and 
possibilities for future research are documented in chapters 5 and 6. 
 1
CHAPTER II - LITERATURE SEARCH 
 
2.1 Intrusion Detection 
 
 
Intrusion detection systems monitor electronic traffic and compare that traffic 
against a pre-existing security policy to confirm that the system is adhering to that policy.  
In more general terms they are a burglar alarm for computers and networks that look for 
criminals breaking into a computer system and send notification of the intrusion [1].  Just 
like a physical burglar alarm that would protect your home, there are many different 
types of intrusion detection systems.  These different types of systems take into account 
specialized security needs.    
Intrusion detection had humble beginnings; the detection engine was comprised of 
an individual sitting behind a terminal looking for anything out of the ordinary, or in 
some cases audit logs were printed on fan-fold paper that often reached heights of five 
feet while waiting for human analysis [2]. It should be noted that these were not even 
intrusion detection techniques.  More realistically, they were system recovery or forensic 
techniques since it was highly unlikely that any attacker would be caught in the act.   
The first work on a formal intrusion detection system was published in 1980 by 
James P. Anderson.  His work set a framework for the general design of a system which 
provided an initial set of tools to computer system security officers [3].  This paper set 
the wheels in motion for computing professionals to look toward the future and realize 
that security practices of the day would not be adequate for the computing activities in 
the future.  This is particularly evident in today’s access control mechanisms that are 
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installed directly into operating systems that help monitor everything from the power grid 
to medical information. 
Later, Dorothy Denning published a paper describing a system whose model is 
based on the hypothesis that security violations can be detected by monitoring a system's 
audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage. The model included profiles for 
representing the behavior of subjects with respect to objects.  These objects represented 
metrics, statistical models, and rules for acquiring knowledge about behavior from audit 
records and for detecting anomalous behavior [3].  This framework for an intrusion 
detection system described an implementation-specific solution to a problem that had and 
will plague computing professionals for years to come, and this framework is the 
foundation of almost every intrusion detection system. 
Intrusion detection has several flavors, many of which will be described 
throughout this document.  Host based and network based are the main types of intrusion 
detection systems and these systems can be created as anomaly based or misuse 
(signature) based.  However, since all of these systems are designed for the same 
purpose, they all share the same basic components.  These universal mechanisms monitor 
an information source, detect a threat using an analysis engine, and respond to the 
perceived threat [4]. 
2.1.1 Host Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
The first formally developed intrusion detection systems were host-based systems.  
Their defining characteristic is that they collect information about a service running on a 
host computer.  Once the data is collected, it must be processed; this can be done locally 
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or remotely and still satisfies the requirements for a host-based system because the data 
being processed is only pertinent for a single host [7].   
An undeniable advantage of a host based intrusion detection system is its ability 
to detect the malicious use of a system by an insider.  These systems can reside within the 
trusted network and can be deployed easily for a variety of services.  If a trusted user 
attempts an unauthorized action, a host based system has a high probability of detecting 
this action. In addition to detecting unauthorized insider activity, host based systems are 
also effective at detecting unauthorized file modification [4]. 
As with any system, there are also downsides to host based systems.  First of all, 
the amount of raw data to be processed could weigh so heavily on the system that the 
service, as well as host, could be rendered useless.  This would be apparent in high traffic 
services utilized by multiple users.  Internal web servers often experience this problem.  
Another scenario would be if the system was compromised by an unknown attack, the 
audit/security logging functions could be disabled without the knowledge of security 
personnel.  
The information source for host based intrusion detection systems are the 
audit/security logs generated by the service being monitored, usually at the operating 
system level [1].  The analysis engine, located on the physical machine, is a set of pre-
programmed rules.  The response to an attack is usually to notify security personnel.  
These components constitute the main elements of a host based intrusion detection 
system: an information source, an analysis engine, and a method of response for alerting 
purposes.  
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2.1.2 Network Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
While host based systems monitor traffic for a specific service on a network, 
network based systems monitor and analyze packets that are sent over a network, usually 
with network devices operating in promiscuous mode [1].  Since this type of system 
monitors traffic throughout the network, there are more considerations to take into 
account.  First of all, placement of the system becomes important because of the nature of 
the network based system.  These systems examine every packet, therefore prudent 
placement could mean the difference between the intrusion detection system delivering 
malicious packets or successfully analyzing them and reporting a threat.  Because of the 
nature and amount of the information to be processed, network based systems tend to be 
distributed to handle the analysis of a greater volume of traffic. 
Data utilized by network based systems is usually “sniffed” out of network traffic 
because TCP and UDP traffic is usually not stored for any noticeable duration of time at 
its endpoint.  As a result it is imperative that the intrusion detection system analyze 
packets en-route.   
Unlike host based systems, network based systems are best at detecting 
unauthorized outsider access.  They also address a flaw in the logic of host based 
systems; in a distributed attack, there could be several target hosts.  Each, if 
compromised, would provide a useful piece of information necessary to compromise the 
network or a host within the network.  A host based system might not see this iterative 
attack as a threat because of the relatively small steps taken over a large number of hosts, 
whereas a network-based system looks at the network as a whole.   
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There are, however, downsides to network-based intrusion detection systems.  
High speed networks are not conducive to packet sniffing because of the speed of the 
packet going through the network.  Examining every packet can prove time consuming 
and can undermine the high investment put into high speed data networks due to the 
latency issues caused by this examination. 
2.1.3 Anomaly and Misuse (Signature) Based Models 
 
Anomaly and misuse models function in very different ways.  Anomaly based 
models sense “abnormal” system or user behavior to detect anomalies.  Behavior is 
characterized as “abnormal” if it goes against a pre-existing statistical model that 
represents normal user and system behavior.  This requires system administrators and 
security officers to build and periodically update a profile that corresponds to normal 
behavior.  This can be advantageous because no prior knowledge of attacks needs to be 
known; the model is catered to a specific network with specific needs.  However, these 
needs are certain to change over time and the model must be updated.  In addition to a 
need for constant monitoring, imprecise and imperfect models are susceptible to a high 
rate of false alarms or a high rate of undetected anomalous behavior [7]. 
Misuse or signature based models monitor network traffic searching for activity 
patterns that match a known attack or other violation of security policy [1].  For example, 
an obsolete attack known as the “Land Attack” creates an impossible packet with the 
same source and destination IP address, which is the IP of a target machine.   In some 
older systems, this illegal packet causes an unhandled error and will cause the target 
system to crash.  Human intervention would be needed to reboot the machine.  A single 
packet arriving at the target is all that is needed to execute this attack [8].  A misuse 
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based model with an existing rule for all illegally structured packets would catch this 
attack.  Since only known vulnerabilities have known signatures and can be recorded into 
a rule set, misuse models cannot detect new or unknown attacks [7].   
2.1.4 The Snort Intrusion Detection System 
 
Snort is an open source network based intrusion detection system, capable of 
performing real time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks.  The varieties of 
tasks performed by this application are limited only by the imagination.  Some of the 
basic functions include protocol analysis as well as content searching and matching.  It 
should be noted that any necessary analysis could be performed on network traffic 
because of the architecture, but the main functions to date are designed to detect network 
intrusions.  These functions allow the application to detect numerous kinds of attacks 
including, but not limited to, buffer overflows, CGI attacks, and OS fingerprinting 
attacks.   
The custom rules language that allows network traffic to be screened with a 
detection engine allows for a lightweight, flexible product that can be configured to meet 
the needs of almost any host.  The real-time alerting capabilities of Snort can be 
configured to output through a number of different mechanisms including a UNIX 
socket, any user specified file, or WinPopup messages.  
Snort has three primary uses. It can be used as a straight packet sniffer like 
tcpdump(1), a packet logger, or as a full blown network intrusion detection system[28]. 
This self-proclaimed de-facto standard of intrusion detection systems was first envisioned 
by Martin Roesch in November of 1998.  The early version of the system was meant to 
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be a promiscuous mode packet sniffer, but has grown into the most widely deployed 
intrusion detection and prevention technology in the world [29].   
 
The basic architecture of Snort is shown below in Figure 2.1 
 
Figure 2.1: Basic Architecture of the S
 
e.  
fined, Snort decodes the IP protocol and 
the TCP or UDP packet.   
ms 
nort Intrusion Detection System [33] 
Whenever network traffic comes into contact with a host running Snort, the 
execution path is as follows.  First, the packet capture module pulls unprocessed layer 2 
ethernet frames using LibPcap in a LINUX environment or WinPcap on a Windows 
system.  Next, the decoder takes the raw layer 2 data packets and decodes each fram
Each frame is classified by the LAN technology, such as Ethernet, Token Ring, Wi-Fi, 
PPP, or MPLS.  After the LAN technology is de
The preprocessing module of this application takes decoded data and perfor
some basic transformations.  Preprocessors can create an alert on, classify, or drop a 
packet before sending it to the more computationally expensive detection engine.  The 
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“out of the box” preprocessors check each packet to ensure that its format is valid based 
on the RFC standard.  An improperly formatted packet is usually mea
network vulnerabilities, such as the obsolete “Land Attack” [8] and will most likely be 
considered malicious. 
Up until this point, the only actions taken on the input data are its capture and 
basic transformation in order to create a standard form for the information to be 
nt to expose 
process
t 
nsible for placing the information in a specified location in a specified 
format.  This customizable module allows users to output to any desired datasource. 
Based on the architecture and nature of this open source application, a customized 
trusion detection system can be deployed in less than an hour as a quick fix or as a long 
term solution in a network.  As stated above, the architecture allows simple customization 
in three separate nodes: the preprocessors, the detection plug-ins, and the output plug-ins.  
This powerful customization feature allows security personnel to have complete control 
over their project from start to finish and provides an ideal environment for research 
applications.    
 
ed.  The detection engine does the majority of this processing by comparing the 
captured and transformed data with the rules based detection plug-in.  These rules are 
created by the Snort development team with help from public and private sector security 
personnel throughout the world and are offered for free download at 
http://www.snort.org.  It is also possible to create custom rules based on the predefined 




2.2 Threat Evaluation 
 
On 8 May 1980, the thirty-third World Health Assembly declared that smallpox 
had been eradicated globally [9].  The World Health Organization realized that, acros
the world, smallpox was an epidemic that could be handled through an aggressive 
monitoring and vaccination program.  For the first time in history, mankind had 
vanquished a disease. It must be borne in mind, however, that this was not the first 
attempt at global disease eradication, but the fifth [10].  The idea of evaluating t
computer systems holds as many complications as dealing with a world-wide spread of 
an infectious disease.  There are 
s 
hreats to 
several important lessons to be learned from the program 
to erad
ould 
  Disgruntled 
employ to the 
 
at amount of debate over acts that seem as simple as an automated port scan.  
icate smallpox; first of all, the threat must be identified.  The news of this 
identification must propagate through all affected areas and preventative measures sh
be in place to deal with the spreading of this threat.  The major difference between a 
human disease and a computer vulnerability or threat is the timeline; these activities do 
not take place over the course of years, they take place over the course of minutes.  A 
threat, in general, is regarded as a possible danger [11].  Therefore, all traffic moving in 
and out of a host within a network is a threat to the network itself.
ees, uneducated users, or compromised machines all pose potential hazards 
functional status of a network.   
Servers and networks receive an almost constant bombardment from outsiders; 
automated scripts ranging in complexity from port scanning to distributed denial of 
service attacks.  Information about these automated tasks changes from day to day and is













rs and figures are hard to come by and are convoluted at best, but what is know
is that computer systems are compromised by outside attackers.   
Another type of threat to computer systems is insider abuse.  According to 
WarRoom Research’s 1996 Information Systems Security Survey, 62.9% of the 
companies surveyed reported insider misuse of their organization’s computer systems 
[12].  These attacks happen within the network, and in most cases the data does not 
through any security mechanism such as a firewall.  They are carried out by m
d employees who know the systems they are attacking and the security measures
in place.   
The Computer Security Institute’s 1998 Computer Crime Survey, conducted 
jointly with the FBI, reported the average cost of an outsider penetration was $56,000, 
while the average insider attack cost a company $2.7 million [13].  These types of threats
along with unintentional damage, pose a giant prob
 computer network, and many approaches have been designed and implemented 
to mitigate these threats.  The most interesting of these methodologies is called the 
human immunology method, which is based on the human immune system.  
By far, the most complex physical system that exists to date is the human body; 
thus the ideas encapsulated during human evolution can be used as a basis for research 
into many areas.  The most intriguing idea, with respect to Network Security, is
red approach the immune system takes for protecting the body.  The skin pro
a defense against external pathogens and is relatively successful in restricting pathogens
from entering the body.  But people still get sick.  
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Because the skin is not 100% successful in restricting access to the body, there
internal systems in place.  These internal systems must decide whether or not what th
are analyzing belongs in the body.  In other words, the system must classify organisms as 
“self” or “non-self” in order to be effective.  If the organism is classified as “self” it is left 
alone, because it belongs in the body.  However, if the entity is classified as “non-self”, 
the immune system attemp
 are 
ey 
ts to purge the body of the unauthorized presence.   
n 
as a 
and molecules.  Computer security often involves 
protecting multiple sites or networks.  In these environments, once a way is found to 
void detection in one network, all networks become vulnerable.  A better approach 
would be to provide each protected location with a unique set of detectors.  This concept 
makes sense with respect to intrusion detection systems because of the vast differences in 
user behavior from one network to another.  Thus if one were compromised, others would 
likely remain secure [15]. 
This approach to mitigating threats through a network will be discussed in more 
detail in later phases of this document.  However, the basic goal is clear:  creating a 
stable, adaptable definition for “self” and using that definition to categorize traffic 
through a network as a threat. 
 
the 
Some notable features of the human immune system relevant in the study of 
computer threat evaluation are diversity across different systems and inexact detectio
[14].  Each copy of the immune system is unique.  Each individual in a population h
different set of protective cells 
a
2.3 Fuzzy Logic 
One of the principal difficulties encountered by people in technical sciences is 
need to bridge the gap between human thought and the way machines are told to think.  
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For instance, it is very easy for a human to look at a group of people and consciously sa
“Most people here are young,” but this same simple observation would be relatively ha
for a machine to deduce.  This difficult
y, 
rd 




y are not restricted to the values within boolean logic of true or 
false.  This concept, at first, resembles ordinary probability theory.  An ordinary 
probabilistic methodology defines the probability of a true assertion within a set over the 
course of time.  Membership values within a probability based model are restricted to 
either true or false, showing the value is within the set or not.  This methodology requires 
a crisp definition of entities, usually a square wave or piecewise square function of some 
type.  On the other hand, fuzzy logic assigns a grade of membership for each specific 
 of membership to an entity without rigidly defined boundaries.  If the above 
statement was given the form “Fifty percent, or more, of the people are over the age of 
45,” a computer could very easily give a true or false assertion to the statement.   
Zadeh says that humans have a remarkable ability to assign a grade of 
membership to a given object without a conscious understanding of how the grade is 
calculated [17].  This holds true in cases such as “Is it warm outside?” or with human 
constructions such as heavy, light, good, cold, or somewhat.  In other areas of computing, 
rigid boundaries are defined for imprecise statements like cold.  The definition of cold 
would vary from person to person, and no precise boundaries could be established for 
exactly what is cold and what is not.   
A value within a fuzzy set can include all real numbers in the interval [0, 1
a more exact measurement than typical boolean models.  The measurements g
are more exact because the
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item within the set or the set itself to determine membership. Fuzzy logic membership 
functions can use any mathematical model whose values lie in the interval [0, 1]. 
A typical, crisp machine representation of temperature would look similar to 
figure 2.2, shown below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Crisp Representation of Temperature 
 
However, a representation for temperature using a fuzzy approach would be very 
different due to the gradual changes between membership areas. This is illustrated in 
figure 2.3, shown below. 
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Figure 2.3: Fuzzy Representation of Temperature 
 
The goal of fuzzy logic is to bridge this gap between human thought and m
function, and it can be defined as a kind of logic using graded or qualified statements 
rather than ones that are strictly true or false.  The results of fuzzy reasoning are not as 
achine 
definite as those derived by strict logic, but they cover a larger field of discourse [17]. 
In order for an effective fuzzy approach to be utilized, a membership function 
must be defined.  A mathematical function is made to decide on the representation of the 
grade of membership of an item within a fuzzy set.  This function can be defined in many 
ways, such as an expert system or a panel decision [19]. 
2.3.1 Fuzzy Logic Definitions and Operations 
 
 This section presents a set of definitions for fuzzy logic concepts and operation 
and the contents are integral in the development of fuzzy logic systems. 
 
Universe of Discourse: The collection of elements under consideration. 
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Membership Function: A function that defines the degree of membership of the 
elements in a particular set.  
Fuzzy Set: A set that can contain elements with only a partial degree of membership, this 
set is derived from a particular membership function and each element maps to a real 
number on the interval [0,1] representing the elements grade of membership. 
nion Operation: Represented as A U B, the result of this operation on two fuzzy sets A 
and B is a fuzzy set denoted by A U B whose membership function is given by µAUB  = 
max(µA(x), µB(x)).  This operation is equivalent to the OR operation in Boolean algebra 
and can be visually interpreted as shown in figure 2.4. 
U
 
Figure 2.4: Fuzzy Union Operation 
Intersection Operation:  Represented as A ∩ B, the result of this operation on two fuzzy 
ts A and B is a fuzzy set denoted by A ∩ B whose membership function is given by 
µ   = min(µ (x), µ (x)).  This operation is equivalent to the AND operation in Boolean 





Figure 2.5: Fuzzy Intersection Operation 
 
omplement Operation:  Represented as Ā where A is the fuzzy subset in which the 
comple
his operation is equivalent to the NOT 
operation in Boolean algebra 
C
ment operation is applied.  The result of the operation is a fuzzy set whose 
membership function is given by µĀ = 1 - µA. T
and can be visually interpreted as shown in figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: Fuzzy Complement Operation 
 
Cartesian Product: Represented as A x B where A and B are fuzzy subsets.  The 
Cartesian product is the binary variable represented by µA x B(u,v) = µA(u) *V* µB(v).  
ple, A = {a,b} and B = {c,d,e,f} then the Cartesian product of A and B would be 
equivalent to { (a,c),(a,d),(a,e),(a,f), (b,c),(b,d),(b,e),(b,f) } 
Fuzzy Singleton: A fuzzy set, A, whose support is a single point x in the universe of 
discourse X. 
Height of a Fuzzy Set:  The height of a fuzzy set, A, is the set of elements defined in the 
universe of discourse X at which the membership function µ (x) equals one. 
Normal Fuzzy Set:  A fuzzy set is called normal if and only if maximal values of its 
membership function are equal or larger than α. 
rossover Point: The Crossover point of a fuzzy set is the element in U at which its 







2.3.2 Fuzzy Logic Controllers 
The basic ideas of what fuzzy logic is, along with the operations listed in the 
previous section are used to create fuzzy logic controllers that provide solutions to a vast 
number of problems.  The applications for fuzzy logic based systems grows by the day 
but specifically are used in water quality control [20], automatic train operations [21] and 
automotive transmission controls [22].   
A fuzzy logic control system is composed of four principal elements: fuzzy rule base, 
fuzzification interface, fuzzy inference machine, and defuzzification interface [23].  
These components work together to create digital control devices that allow a human 
description of a physical system and of the required control strategy to be simulated in a 
reasonably natural way [19].  A brief description of these components is listed below: 
1. The fuzzy rule base is a collection of rules that define specific actions of the 
expert-system.  These rules follow a basic IF THEN format. 
2. The fuzzification interface maps crisp inputs into their corresponding fuzzy values 
based on the appropriate membership function. 
3. The fuzzy inference machine performs any number of fuzzy logic operations to 
ascertain control action for fuzzy inputs. 
4. The defuzzification interface converts manipulated fuzzy values and creates a 
crisp output for a control device.  
It is noted that DeMorgan’s Law, Associativity, Commutivity, and Distrib
can also be applied in the realm of fuzzy logic. 
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The idea of fuzzifying crisp inputs, doing calculations to create an output, and 
defuzzifing those outputs into crisp values is similar to the methodology of solving a 
linear time-invariant system with a Laplace transform as shown in Figure 2.7 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Laplace Transform vs. Fuzzy Logic Methodology [36] 
 
There have been many attempts to reduce the number of false alarms within 
intrusion detection systems.  Outside of using fuzzy logic, there are two notable 
approaches: data mining and the use of neural networks. 
Data mining is the nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and 
potentially useful information from data [24]. The key ideas are to use data mining 
techniques to discover consistent and useful patterns of system features that describe 
program and user behavior, and use the set of relevant system features to compute 
inductively learned classifiers that can recognize anomalies and known intrusions [25].  
This approach to intrusion detection sifts through large amounts of data collected using 
the audit capabilities of the host machine and uses this information to create detection 
models for the intrusion detection system.  The creation of detection models is based on 
2.4 Other Methodologies for Intrusion Detection 
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the fundamental principals of data mining that have been inspired from a wide variety 
statistically related fields.   
of 
Since this approach to intrusion detection is based on a statistical model, it can be 
pproached in an implementation free environment.  A widely used, hypothetical, 
example of data mining would use the transaction history of any large supermarket chain.  
Analysis of transactions of goods bought over a defined period of time could find that 
two seemingly unrelated products such as beer and diapers are often bought together.  
Drawing this conclusion is not intuitive and would be very difficult without data mining 
in a large set of data; however, taking advantage of this relationship would be very easy.  
Herein lays the strength and weakness of an approach to intrusion detection using data 
ining.  It requires a large amount of data to be processed for correlations to be drawn.  
he necessity for this large amount of data could pose a vulnerability to systems that 
have not collected a sufficient audit trail, and the system could be compromised before 
the audit trail is of sufficient size.  This would make the audit trail itself vulnerable and 
taint the results of any analysis.   
Another weakness of a data mining approach to intrusion detection is the 
foundation of data mining itself.  Data mining finds correlation between two seemingly 
unrelated entities.  Correlation between entities does not imply causation.  It is not 
uncommon for a data mining set to find over five hundred correlations between data, 
while less than ten of them are worthwhile [26].  A typical correlation that could be found 
is as follows: 





Therefore, ice-cream causes crime. 
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While ice cream sales and crime might be strongly correlated, this type of thinking do
not take into account the element of coincidence or other confounding factors.  While the
fundamentals of data mining are important in many aspects of computer science, there are
serious flaws for applications involving security.  
Neural networks are also an active area of research in the field of computer 





detection system is that a user leaves a specific print when using a system.  The neural 
network is utilized to identify this print and identify a user based on their specific 
behavior [27].  Most neural network based systems are computationally expensive and 
run in offline mode.  A single job run at the end of day processes audit logs left on host 
computers, finding suspicious behavior and alerting personnel to launch an investigation.  
It is also widely speculated that the scalability of neural network based systems 
would present a problem when the amount of users exceeds a typical small business.  
However, the method of neural networks does an excellent job in building a real time 






2.5 Fuzzy Logic Approaches to Intrusion Detection 
 
The first notable intrusion detection system to utilize fuzzy logic is the real tim
security system, RETISS [30]. The system is based on the idea that a correl
ous user behavior and threats.  Each rule corresponds to a weight table that 
expresses a level of danger for a specific anomaly.  These weights, based on level o
danger, are piped through a fuzzy inference module and combined using fuzzy logic to 




Figure 2.8: RETISS Architecture [34] 
 
This system was implemented on a Sun 3/50 workstation with the Common List 
programming language and runs on a machine separated from the target system.  This 
separation avoids overloading the activity of the target system and protects RETISS from 
target system users [30].  Even though this platform was chosen by its designers, this 
implementation can be adapted for any platform. 
Another notable intrusion detection system is the fuzzy Intrusion Recognition 
Engine, FIRE, which is a network based intrusion detection system that uses an agent 
based methodology [31].  This agent based methodology, based on AAFID developed at 
Purdue by Zamboni, et al., allows each individual agent to perform as a separate 
fuzzification interface while communicating with a fuzzy inference engine.   
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As shown below, this agent based system uses three main modules: agents (A), 
transceivers (T), and monitors (M).  Agents monitor processes of the host, while 
transceivers control local agents and act as communication tools between agents and 
onitors, while monitors control local and remote entities.  Monitors handle correlation 




 and send alarms to the user interface (UI).  Agents a1-a5, shown below, would 
assigned to different types of traffic such as TCP, UDP, or specific categories of th
These agents would pass information, through a transceiver to a monitor.  This dia
dictates that M1 is the monitor for FIRE and M2 is the monitor for AAFID [31]. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: FIRE Architecture [31] 
This process, while complex, is an active area of research because of system 
expandability.  Expanding an agent based system to encompass new threats could be 
done by deploying a new agent based on expert knowledge of the threat.    
Another approach to the use of fuzzy logic in intrusion detection was introduced 
by Yingbing Yu in a dissertation titled, “Anomaly Intrusion Detection and Threat 





es generalized fuzzy number with a weighted value.  
This m
t 
f the goals, however, are aimed at reducing the number of false alarms. 
 
ction of threats using a hierarchical fuzzy threat evaluation mechanism.  First, a 
finite automata is created to model the behavior of users and the system, based on 
behavior profile.  These behaviors are applied to measure similarity as well as devi
for behavior.  After behavior is categorized as self or non-self, a hierarchial fuzzy 
reasoning system compares calculat
odel can detect masqueraders and intrusion scenarios in a relatively short 
timespan. 
There have been other approaches using fuzzy logic, such as the approach 
proposed by Jianxiong Luo and Susan Bridges.  Their approach integrates the mining of 
fuzzy association rules and frequency episodes with fuzzy logic to produce more abstrac
and flexible patterns for intrusion detection [32].  These approaches to fuzzy logic all 
introduce elements of architecture and design that allow the achievement of specific 
goals.  All o
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CHAPTER III – DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
3.1 The Problem 
 
 
Intrusion detection systems, especially those that are signature based, present 
security personnel with vast amounts of alert data.  In the case of the open source 
intrusion detection tool, Snort, alerts are sent to an output plug-in which presents 
information to an authorized person in any m nner they wish to implement.  It will be 
assumed that in most systems, alerts are logged in a MySQL database.  Even though a 
relational database is an efficient storage mechanism with production grade read and 












mes, the number of logged alerts can quickly grow beyond the analytical sk
any human.  The questions at this point become, “how secure is this network?” and “w
alerts are the most critical, so they can be prioritized for patching and upgrades?”   
How can someone easily analyze this collected data and give a meaning
with a high probability that the alerts in question do not represent a false positive?  
Approaching this problem using fuzzy logic can significantly reduce the workload of 
security personnel by evaluating alerts in parallel and giving a reasonable snapshot of a 
threat level.  An automated real-time fuzzy logic threat evaluation system, the ARF
evaluation system, will be implemented to address this problem.  This software packag
will from here on be referred to as, ARF.  This chapter addresses desig
fo
 26
ARF is to be written using an interface for every step of the fuzzy process as w
as an interface for the fuzzy rules used in the inferen
ell 
ce machine and membership 
fun his will allow for a scalable, tunable 
app ecific rules and more 
com
security personnel to get a 
snapshot of the level of threat in a single sensor as well as a comparative view of all 
nsors in a network.  While little or no knowledge of fuzzy logic is needed to make 
inferences about the level ertinent metrics and the 
bility  




e information and 




ctions used in the fuzzification process.  T
lication that can be easily adapted to allow the addition of sp
plex mathematical calculation. 
The GUI should provide an avenue for experienced 
se
of threat in a network, knowledge of p
a to create and understand fuzzy rules based on the metrics is required to tune the
application to a certain environment.  This application, for instance, would employ a 
separate rule base if it were inside the protected network
k.   
Due to the proliferation of technology within our society and the variety of 
applications and platforms available, the application uses the Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) for all non-database persistent storage.  This feature will undoubtedl
increase the availability of the analyzed output data for future applications and reporti
mechanisms and provide a simple format for the application to parse th
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3.3 Setup Requirements 
 
 
Intelligent sensor placement should be the first step in deploying any in
3.3.1 Network Setup Requirements 
trusion 
detection system.  A typical intrusion detection sensor placement, according to Earl 
Carter of the Cisco Press, is shown below in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Typical Intrusion Detection Sensor Placement [35]  
on 
 
Notice that even within a trusted network there are multiple sensors.  In a 
commercial setting, it is prudent to use a separate machine on the network acting as a 
pass-through device for a sensor.  In reality, a sensor is software and could be placed 
any machine, including desktops and servers.  This is not common practice in 
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commercial servers because the fear of placing extra computational load on a production 
machine directly affects the performance of a server as well as the expense of upgrading 
hard drives in a redundant array.  It is also not considered a best practice to use a sensor 
n a desktop because the data collected would be specific to the traffic on a single 
computer.  The optimal situation fo  dedicated machine with two 
etwor
o 
onnections on port 3306. 
3. 
 
dification.  However, the 
tables that will be used for analysis by the application are shown below.  Only fields 
pplicable to the function of the application are shown. 
The EVENT table, shown in Figure 3.2, is the most commonly referenced table in 
the MySQL database created by Snort.  The primary key two-tuple is made up of a sensor 
o
r a sensor would be a
n k interface cards acting as a gateway on a branch of a network. 
 
For academic and experimental purposes, a standalone sensor using Snort, Apache, 
SSL, PHP, MySQL, and BASE on a computer running an updated version of Fedora 
Core 4 is utilized as a data collection agent.  The only requirements for this sensor t
operate properly with the proposed application are: 
1. Snort must use MySQL to log alerts. 
2. MySQL must accept TCP/IP c
For security purposes, MySQL should include a user account with SELECT 
privileges for the application to view the alert logs. 
3.3.2 Database Setup Requirements 
 
3.3.2.1 Remote/Sensor Databases 
Applicable tables in a sensor database require no mo
a
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ID, allowing multiple sensors on a network to report to the same database as well as a 
command ID that identifies the alert with an auto-incrementing integer.  The MySQL 
data types for these fields are, respectively, integer(10), integer(10), integer(10), and 
atetime, where all integers are unsigned and all fields are required.   d
 
Figure 3.2: Event Table 
The IPHDR table, shown in Figure 3.3, has a one to one row relationship with the 
event table and holds all IP header information as specified in RFC 791.  IP addresses are 
stored as integers to reduce space required and can be transformed using the MySQL 
methods IP address = inet_ntoa(integer) and Integer = inet_aton(IP Address). 
 
Figure 3.3: IPHDR Table 
 
As alerts are inserted into the MySQL database, Snort checks to see if the alert 
gnature already exists within the SIGNATURE table, shown in Figure 3.4.  If the 
signature do e 
si
es not exist, it inserts a row to identify the integer signature recorded in th
EVENT table.  In other words, this table shows the textual name of numerical signatures 
referenced from other tables. 
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Figure 3.4: Signature Table 
 
*Note: non-applicable fields have been omitted from Figures 3.2 – 3.4 
3.3.2.1 Application Database 
 
A computer running the application to be described requires the presence of a 
MySQL server instance.  The tables to be created are exact replicas of the tables 
mentioned in the previous section with the exception of the primary keys in the event and 
IPHDR table.  The primary key for the application, or local database is a three-tuple 
consisting of (sid,cid,nid) where nid is an alias or other identifier to identify the sensor 
with a network.  This is necessary because all data from all sensors will be copied to the 





ARF is implemented using the .NET framework 1.1 and the C# (C Sharp) 
programming language.  Using this framework, it is possible to make use of not only the 
object oriented nature of the language and the powerful debugging tools, but also a vast 
array of inheritable built-in objects.  The application includes one external reference to 
the MySQL Connector/NET which implements ADO.NET interfaces allowing for 
simple, secure, and high-performance data connectivity to a MySQL database from any 
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.NET application.  MySQL Connector/NET is well documented and available for free 
download at h
A fuzzy logic approach to analyzing data collected from Snort is used to work 
wards the goal of reducing the
running about 
 
The application exists in two logically separated modules.  The GUI with its 
associated properties and method t g, connecting to, 
display sensor.  
 
l 
the fuzzy logic process. 
1.  class to adapt a DataTable, representing alerts in a remote database, sent by the 
UI into predefined metrics. 
2.  class to fuzzify the metrics calculated from the previous class based on 
edefined membership functions. 
ttp://www.mysql.org.  
to  number of false positives in an intrusion detection sensor 
 Snort.  This approach needs to display pertinent and detailed information 
the data being analyzed and output a level of threat based on alerts of the host in question. 
These outputs should be organized on a graphical user interface (GUI) and create an 
intuitive “snapshot” of many sensors over many networks. 
3.4.2 Application Flow  
 
s need o take care of creatin
ing, and synchronizing databases between the application and a selected 
Another main module should be the fuzzy logic module that accepts a set of data from
MySQL and returns a floating point number between 0 and 1 that indicates the level of 
threat for the sensor. 
 







3.  values from a base of rules and create 
ss for display in the GUI. 
4. 
].  This outputted value will be displayed on the GUI. 
Eac nt an interface designated for the particular 
step in s will create an environment in 
which t ew functionality and perform basic maintenance will be greatly 
reduced.   




e order in which they 
ect_Name c)  
this[int Index] 
 
These methods allow adding of encing the objects within 
the collection with an integer index.  Any other functionality will not be permitted on 
custom collections, as they are meant to be containers for data. 
A class to make inferences about the fuzzy
an XML file to log specifics of the proce
A class to defuzzify the output of the previous class, which gives a threat value on 
the interval [0,1
h of these classes needs to impleme
the fuzzy process in which they reside.  This proces
he effort to add n
pplication Objec
Every step in the fuzzy logic module of the application should output a typed 
collection of custom objects for experimental and debugging purposes.  The objects 
all applicable output calculations from the previous class and serve as an input to the nex
class.  A typed collection of custom objects is implemented in order to reduce the 
possibility of running the fuzzy logic classes in any order except th
are designed to be run. The collections should implement the methods:  
public virtual void Add(Obj
public virtual Object_Name 
 objects to a collection and refer
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CHAPTER IV – IMPLEMENTATION 
 
4.1 Implementation Details 
The implementation of the application, ARF, uses two main categories of 
software components.  The first component handles all administrative functionality of the 
object and is encapsulated into several instances of System.Windows.Forms objects.  The 
second component handles all fuzzy logic operations and is logically placed inside its 
wn namespace arf.fuzzy.  These components, to be described fully in later sections of 
this chapter, compose the framework for this application.  
ml file was created as a logical container to hold applicable 
forma
many d ferent uld be achieved by 
adding new X
alias fo that n rk it is possible to have zero or many hosts with 








4.1.1 XML Documents 
 
The hosts.x
in tion about sensors.  Using this format, it is possible to hold information about 
if  networks containing many different sensors.  This wo
a ML element named network with a single attribute, name, that denotes an 
r etwork.  Within each netwo







  <network name="419winkler.com"> 
      <alias>Thesis Box</alias> 
      <ip>localhost</ip> 
      <dbname>home_alerts
      <dbuser>root</
    <host> 
</dbname> 
dbuser> 
      <dbpass>password</dbpass> 
    </host> 
    <host> 
      <alias>Test 2</
      <ip>localhost</





that inp complete, the 
System Forms objects are responsible for displaying any necessary analysis.  
transaction management objects. 
4.2.2 Add Network Object 
 
This System.Windows.Forms object, AddNetwork, inherits from the .NET object 
System.Windows.Forms.Form and has a single purpose.  This purpose is to create a new 
network alias in the hosts.xml configuration file.  The desired output of this function will 




      <dbuser>rewt</dbuser> 
      <dbpass>password</dbpass> 
    </host> 
  </network> 
4.2 System.Windows.Forms Objects 
The System.Windows.Forms objects are in charge of collecting input and sen
ut to the fuzzy logic engine for analysis.  After the analysis is 
.Windows.
These tasks are completed using native .NET objects with the exception of a specialized 
tree node class and the MySQL Connector/NET reference.  These 
System.Windows.Forms objects also contain powerful database connectivity and 





AnyNetwork.com denotes an alias which refers to a network containing sensors with 
MySQL databases holding alerts generated by Snort. 
 





Figure 4.1: The AddNetwork object 
The functionality necessary to append this XML element at the end of a list of networks 
within the hosts.xml file is listed below.  This method is triggered by a button click






is.txtNetworkName.Text.Trim() != "" && this.txtNetworkName.Text != null) 
{ 
 // Load Existing hosts.xml file 




 // Create New XML Element 
 newcatalogattr.Value = this.txtNetworkName.Text; 
SetAttributeNode(newcatalogattr); 
 //  Add XML element at end of node list 
networks.DocumentElement.InsertAfter(newcatalogentry, 
networks.DocumentElement.LastChild); 
    
 //  Save the new XML file to disk 






// Close the form 
ment networks = new XmlDocume
ilename); 
 // Create a list of xml nodes with the tag name "network" 
 System.Xml.XmlNodeList nl = networks.GetElementsByTagName("network")
 
 XmlElement newcatalogentry = networks.CreateElement("network"); 
 XmlAttribute newcatalogattr = networks.CreateAttribute("name"); 
 newcatalogentry.
 




The code segment shown above loads the hosts.xml document and adds a new network 
element to the document.  The element added will have the attribute that was typed in






      <ip>Address of MySQL Database Holding Sensor Data</ip> 
 
. 
4.2.3 Add Host Object 
This System.Windows.Forms object, AddHost, inherits the .NET object 
System.Windows.Forms.Form and has a single purpose. This purpose is to create a new
host within a network in the hosts.xml configuration file.  The desired output of this 
function will insert the following into the specified file: 
<host> 
      <alias>Sensor_Alias</alias> 
      <dbname>Name of Database</dbname> 
      <dbuser>Restricted Privilege User</dbuser> 
      <dbpass>Restricted User Password</dbpass> 
</host> 
This information represents all necessary connection information to access the MySQL 
database that is being used by snort on a specific sensor.  The initial state of the 
System.Windows.Forms object, AddHost is shown below in figure 4.2
 
Figure 4.2: The AddHost object 
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The functionality of this object is slightly more complex, but nonetheless a 
variation on a theme.  The list of networks in this form is populated with a list of all th
networks listed in the hosts.xml file, while all other information is provided by the user.  
After all information is entered, th
e 
ere are two separate functions necessary to complete 
the Add e 
 to indicate failure.  
The second function of this object is to save the information typed in each field 
to an XML document.  It should be noted that a valid connection is not required for 
sertion into the XML file and by default, the “Save Changes” functionality prompts the 
ser if the connection is not valid before inserting it into the XML file.  Since the 
 is basically identical to the AddNetwork object, shown in the previous 
ction, code has been omitted in this section and is provided in its entirety in the 
append
 
Forms object, ARF_Main, inherits the .NET object 
System ain functionality of the application and 
is shown below in Figure 4.3. 
Host operation.  The first is a method to test the connection to the sensor whos
information was entered.  This function creates a connection to the server and instantly 
closes it.  If these operations are successful, a message is shown to the user indicating 






ix.   
4.2.4 ARF_Main Object 
This System.Windows.




Figure 4.3: The ARF_Main object 
 
iew 
hows a collapsible list of networks and sensors as well as a 
System
e TreeView object displays a hierarchical collection of labeled items, each 
represented by a System.Windows.Forms.TreeNode or a custom object arf.RevTreeNode.  
A netw nd as 
well as collaps
of these , is 
represe  applicable information about the sensor.  
This in
to a sen erits from the TreeNode object 
The basic components of this object are a System.Windows.Forms.TreeV
object that s
.Windows.Forms.TabControl which organizes data representing a sensor in a 
logical format.  Data shown in the TabControl is changed when a sensor within the 
TreeView object is clicked with a mouse.   
Th
ork is represented as a TreeNode that has children.  The network can expa
e, it can indicate itself with a picture of a computer, and it has an alias.  All 
proper ties are native to this built-in .NET object.  A sensor, however
nted by a custom object that stores all
formation is pulled from the hosts.xml file and is used for all operations referring 
sor on this form.  The object, RevTreeNode, inh
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and serves as a container for applicable information about a sensor.  The image property 
of this 
he fields in 
  
rts 
om a MySQL database. 
e Connectivity and Synchronization 
e ARF_Main object is connecting to, and 
ver installed on the application 
n the sensor.  Excerpts from some of 
se methods are shown below. 
 a RevTreeNode, and connects to a MySQL 
database. If the connection is s n object is returned to the 
alling function, as shown in the segment below. 
 
 
object can either be set to a red circle or a green check, indicating whether or not 
the application has connected to the sensor within the current session. 
The first tab, in the TabControl, shows an exact copy of the alerts generated by 
Snort for the specific sensor in a System.Windows.Form.DataGrid control.  T
this DataGrid are modeled after a basic join of the Snort ‘event’ table and ‘IPHDR’ table.




A major portion of the functionality of th
synchronizing data between, the MySQL database ser
machine and the MySQL database server installed o
the
The first of these database connection methods is ConnectSingleMySql.  This 















///  Connect to a remote database 
/// <param name="conn">The Connection string</param> 
/// <returns>The MySQL connection object or null if connection is not 
private MySqlConnection ConnectSingleMySql(string conn) 
{   
 {  
  MySqlConnection connection = new MySq
  connection.Close(); 









  return null;
 } 
This fu
The SyncSingle function has been shown in a pseudo format because of the length 
of the function.  This function is executed on a RevTreeNode if a valid connection has 
been made with the ConnectSingleMySql function.  This function is shown below in 
pseudo
///<param name="SensorName">Alias of Remote Server to reference in local 
private bool SnycSingle(MySqlConnection connection, string SensorName) 
 // Create transactions of the alerts from Remote DB to be copied locally 
table 
able 
 //  Start the transaction to copy the remote records locally 
} 
This fu he application 
data
 shown below, function acts as a wrapper function for the 
previously listed functions.  Its purpose is to call other functions, if necessary.  This 
 
} 
nctionality allows the application to know, with a high degree of certainty, which 





///  Sync a remote snort databases alert data to the local MySQL Server 
///</summary> 
///<param name="connection">Connection String For Remote MySQL Server</param> 
database</param> 
///<returns>True if the host syncs</returns> 
{ 
 // Find Timestamp of Last Alert Logged Locally for this Sensor 
 //   --> events 
 //   --> iphdr t
 //  If the transaction succeeds, commit the transaction and return true 
 //  if the transaction fails, rollback the transaction and return false 




met ithin a 
networ
/// Connects to the specified RevTreeNode and synchronizes data if need be 
private void ConnectSyncSingle(arf.RevTreeNode m) 
 
+ m.DatabaseUser + "; PASSWORD=" + m.DatabasePassword + ";";   
    
  // Sync the databases 
 
  if(SnycSingle(SingleConnection, m.Alias)) 
   m.SelectedImageIndex = 0; 
} 
 
e ARF_Main form object.  This 
nctio re available and synchronizes the data from their 
alert databases to the local database.  
ark to 
/// </summary> 

















/// <param name="m">The RevTreeNode of the sensor to synchronize</param> 
{ 
 string conn = "SERVER=" + m.IP + "; DATABASE=" + m.DatabaseName + "; UID="
       
 MySqlConnection SingleConnection = ConnectSingleMySql(conn); 
 if(SingleConnection != null) 
 { 
  // change the icon 
          
  { 
   m.ImageIndex = 0; 
  }   
 } 
The final relevant database connection method, MySqlHostConnect, is triggered 
when a button titled ‘Sync Hosts’ is pressed on th
fu n connects to all sensors that a
If a connection was made and data was 
synchronized, then the picture next to the sensor name changes to a green check m
show the user success or a red symbol to show failure.  This function is shown below. 
 
/// <summary> 
///  Connect and Sync all sensors listed for all sites in hosts.xml  




orf (TreeNode n in treeView1.Nodes) 
{ 





These database functions create an easy way to connect to and synchronize data between
multiple sensors over multiple ne
 
tworks.    
4.3.1 Purpose 
The fuzzy logic section of this application creates a standard system of functions 
and objects to assign a level of threat to a sensor on a network.  There are four separate 
steps required in any fuzzy control system, all of which are implemented and outlined 
below.  The controlling class for the fuzzy logic portion of the application, FuzzyEngine, 
receives two inputs: a System.Data.DataSet and a System.Windows.Forms.ListBox.  The 
DataSet holds applicable data about the sensor and the ListBox serves as mechanism to 
s.  With this in mind, 




ascertain the value of predefined, calculable metrics that can be calculated.  
and returns a typed collection of custom objects, to be explained in a later section.   
 
SnortAdapter s = new SnortAdapter(RawAlertDataset); 
4.3 Fuzzy Logic Modules 
 
 
report the status of the fuzzy logic computations during analysi
realize that the entire fuzzy logic component of this application can be invoked with a 
single command as shown in the following code segment:  
          double d = HostThreatLevel(RawAlertDataset,lstXMLOutput); 
Before any type of fuzzy logic operation can be performed, the input data must
sformed.  The SnortAdapter class takes the input DataSet and performs operations t
The following command from the FuzzyEngine class invokes these operations 
CrispThreatCollection c1 = s.CrispThreats; 
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Upon receiving the DataSet, the constructor for the class sorts the dataset based on threat
signature and performs calculations on each collection of rows that is returned.  The 
following metrics were cho
 






for future releases of Snort.  Currently severity measures do not exist within the 
Snort application for all signatures but can be implemented by security personnel 
by modifying a configuration file within the application. At the time of writing, 
this feature is a planned enhancement for future versions of Snort.   
After all calculations are completed, information is stored in a custom object named 
CrispThreat.  This structure contains the properties: 
private int occurances; 
 privat
privat
 private int signature; 
pes as input.  The other takes a 
The number of occurrences of the signature, which is calculated from a sim
counting of the rows.  
2. The time span of the alerts, which is calculated from the last alert subtracted f
the first alert and expressed as System.Ti
The average time between alerts, calculated from the time span divided by the 
number of occurrences. 
4. The number of alerts per source IP address, calculated from the number of 
occurrences divided by the unique source IP addresses.  
5. The severity of the alert: this metric is reserved for future versions of Snort tha
implement this functionality.  The application uses a multiplier of one to account 
e System.TimeSpan timespan; 
e int severity_multiplier;  
 private double src_ip_frequency; 
 private System.TimeSpan avg_time_between; 
 
The CrispThreat object also contains two constructors, one of which takes all of 
the calculated metrics and their respective data ty
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CrispThreat object and creates an exact copy.  Since there will be a CrispThreat object 
reated for every unique signature that occurs in a host, it is necessary to create a 
container for these objects.  The implementation of a collection of CrispThreat objects, 
CrispThreatCollection, is shown in the following set of declarations. 
public class CrispThreatCollection : System.Collections.CollectionBase 
 { 
       
  get 
} 
mentation provides the necessary protection for data and application flow as 
set out in the design document.  
4.3.3 Fuzzification Interface 
 
The fuzzification interface transforms the CrispThreat objects within their 
respective collection.  Each metric within a CrispThreat object is processed by a 
predefined membership function and returns a fuzzy value in the interval [0,1].  The 
fuzzification interface is defined as a step in the fuzzy logic process and should not be 
confused with a .NET interface.   
 p
listed i
  FuzzyThreatCollection GetFuzzyThreats(); 
c
{ 
 public virtual void Add(CrispThreat c) 
  this.List.Add(c); 
 } 
 public virtual CrispThreat this[int Index] 
 { 
  {return (CrispThreat)this.List[Index];} 
 } 
This imple
A rogrammatic interface is defined for this section of the fuzzy logic module and 
n the following code segment. 
 public interface IFuzzification 
 { 
FuzzyThreat MakeFuzzy(CrispThreat c); 




The methods described in the interface shown above must be implemented in the class 
that is used in the fuzzification process.  For example, every method for fuzzification 
would be able to: 
1. Take a CrispThreat, apply the MakeFu zy function, and return a FuzzyThreat 
2. Take a collection of CrispThreats, apply the MakeFuzzy function, and return a 
 the 
Wit ed that 
elevant at this point because actions are 
ould be achieved is shown in 
uzzificationMembershipFunction(c1); 
FuzzyThreatCollection f1 = f.GetFuzzyThreats(); 
keyword listed above. 
A key aspect of the functionality for this module of the fuzzy logic components is 
creating membership functi t in the design phase.  




collection of FuzzyThreats. 
3. Access the calculated FuzzyThreatCollection from anywhere in the scope of
IFuzzification object.  
h this concept in mind, a FuzzificationMembershipFunction class is creat
implements the interface IFuzzification.  Functionality in the 
FuzzificationMembershipFunction class is not r
taken on the IFuzzification object.  A sample of how this w
the code segment below. 
IFuzzification f = new F
 
For future changes of membership functions, all a programmer would need to change in 
the fuzzy logic modules of this application would be the name of the class after the new 
ons for each metric deemed pertinen
trics and their associated membership functions are listed below, starting wi
number of occurrences of a specific alert signature.  The membership function create
model the level of threat based on occurrences of an alert is shown below.  Notice the
gradual change in the dependant variable as the independent variable rises.   
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Figure 4.4: Membership Function: Number of Occurrences 
 
The next membership function represents the span of time from the first occurrence of a 
signature and the last signature.  This function assigns a greater level of threat if logged 
alerts occur in a relatively short period of time. 
 
Figure 4.5: Membership Function: Timespan Between Attacks 
 
The av fined as the time span between the first and last 
alert divided by the number of occurrences.  
erage time between attacks is de
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Another metric that is calculated from the time between attacks and the number
occurrences is defined as the average time between attacks membership function.  This
membership function is used in conjunction with other functions to create a rule that 
be composed of several different metrics.  This allows for a greater degree of control 






Figure 4.6: Membership Function: Average Time Between Attacks 
 
The final metric is the membership function associated with the frequency of 
alerts from a specific IP address.  This is defined as a stepwise function, shown below.  
This m ng 
source IP frequency is low a lower threat 
ed that the same entity is trying the 
etric is determines the number of different source IP addresses that are generati
alerts based on signature and is used to create composite rules.  For example, if the 
average time between attacks is low and the 
level could be generated because it would be assum





The current mathematical capabilities of the application are membership functions 
defined b
Figure 4.7: Membership Function: Attacks Per IP 
y a set of points or as a polynomial function.  However, this can be easily 
ce.  
cation interface is a collection of 
 following properties:  
 double fuzz_src_ip_frequency; 
private double fuzz_avg_time_between; 
 private CrispThreat crisp; 
e double variables are the output of their respective membership 
expanded by creating a new class that implements the custom IMath interfa
The output object created by the fuzzifi





e double fuzz_severity_multiplier;  privat
 private
 
   
 private int signature; 
 
These privat
functions, outlined above.  This object also holds a copy of the CrispThreat object created 
in the previous function.  The purpose for this feature is to allow for future calculations in 
the inference and defuzzification mechanisms.    
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4.3.4 Fuzzy Inference Machine 
 
The fuzzy inference machine is the heart of the fuzzy logic modules in this 
application.  It takes the fuzzy objects for each signature, calculated previously, and 
applies a set of rules to create a level of threat for a sensor.  This step also creates an 
XML log file detailing the threat levels of all the objects before they are defuzzified.   








Engine.   
sing this interface, the following function call is performed in the FuzzyEngine class to 
execute this step of the fuzzy logic process.  
IInferenceEngine i = new RuleBasedInference(f1); 
FuzzyThreatLevelCollection f2 = i.GetFuzzyThreatLevel(); 
 
Each IInferenceEngine engine has an associated set of rules.  These rules make all 
inferences about threat levels.  This set of rules maps a threat level to a specific signature 
nceEngine 
FuzzyThreatLevel           FuzzyInference(FuzzyThreat f); 
FuzzyThreatLevelCollection GetFuzzyThreatLevel(); 
 
The methods described in this interface provide functionality, respectively, to: 
1. Take a collection of FuzzyThreat objects and return a collection of 
FuzzyThreatLevel objects that are created with a rules-based system. 
2. Take a single FuzzyThreat object and return a single FuzzyThreatLevel object 
created with a rules-based system. 




based on the metrics calculated from the set of alerts.  An excerpt from a sample rule is 
shown in the code listed below.  
//'WEB-MISC /home/www access' 
// http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1671 
// Low threat 
private double WEB_MISC_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
{ 
     double threat = startlow; 
     if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) && this.IsLow(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
 threat += .5; 
 
     return threat; 
} 
This alert was evaluated to have a low threat level, however, it states that if the threat 
from the source IP addresses are high and the threat calculated from the average time 
between is low, then the threat level should be elevated.  These rules, along with all 
others, form an integral step in the fuzzy logi  process.  They dictate how alerts should be 
After the FuzzyThreatLevelCollection is created from the set of rules, the contents 
of the collection are used to create an XML document for System.Windows.Forms 
objects to display as needed.  This document follows the format shown below: 
 
4 PM"> 




Since the fuzzy logic modules of the application do not and should not necessitate a 
database connection, the signature is outputted in a numerical format.  This functionality 
gives a more detailed look at exactly what alerts are considered the most threatening with 
respect to a sensor on a network.   
c
treated, and allow the application to assign a grade of membership in the fuzzy category, 
threat. 
<host name="Insert Sensor Alias Here" time="4/2/2006 4:28:2
    <fuzzy_value>.64</fuzzy_value> 
  </signature> 
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The output object created by the fuzzy inference mechanism is a collection of 





This object represents a threat level for a specific signature that has been calculated based 
on metrics found in previous objects being subjected to signature-based rule.   
 step 
plements the interface listed 
below. 







   count++; 
evel; 
 return dValue/(double)count; 
 
cts.  This custom structure is represented by 
 
 
4.3.5 Defuzzification Interface 
 
The final step in the fuzzy logic process is the defuzzification process.  This
makes a calculation on each FuzzyThreatLevel object and returns a number that signifies 
a level of threat for a sensor.  The defuzzification process im
 
{ 
double Defuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i); 
  double GetCrispOutput(); 
 } 
This interface exists because of the number of methods to defuzzify a fuzzy set.  The 
method chosen to defuzzify the FuzzyThreatLevelCollection object is the Mean of 
Maximum. This method takes a simple average of all fuzzy threat levels and re
result.   
public double Defuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i) 
  int    count = 0; 
  double dValue= 0.0; 
  foreach(FuzzyThreatLevel t in i) 
  { 
   dValue += t.Fuzzy_Threat_L





The value calculated at by the Defuzzify function is the value that is returned to the 
c orms o ch is designated as the threat level for the 
application.   
 ere are several method
method ng 
etter.  Returning the 
maximum value in the fuzzy set would increase the weight on low threat objects in a 
milar fashion as higher priority threats, causing a reduction of reliability of output data.  
The center of area method could be an appropriate solution but was not chosen due to the 
mathematical complexity of the algorithm. 
4.4 Diagrams 
4.4.
The following diagram shows the basic flow between the fuzzy logic classes.  The 
the FuzzyEngine class before proceeding to the next step.  For this diagram to be 
class and each step of the fuzzy logic process. However, it has been determined that the 
 
alling System.Windows.F bject, whi
Th s available for defuzzification, with no clear 
ology on how to pick a defuzzification method.  Other methods include, returni
the maximum membership value for a fuzzy set and a method to compute the center of 
area for all overlaid membership functions with the dependant variable specified on the 
appropriate axis.  Changing to one of these methods would drastically change the 
experimental outputs of this application, not necessarily for the b
si
1 ARF Class Diagram 
 
actual implementation varies slightly from what is shown in one respect.  The 
FuzzyEngine class is acting as a controlling class and information is actually sent back to 
programmatically accurate there would be a call and response between the FuzzyEngine 
application flow and object manipulation is described with more detail in the following
diagram, figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8: Fuzzy Logic Class Diagram
 
 
Some typical intrusion detection sensor placements are shown in the following diagram, 
figure 4.9.   
 
Figure 4.9: High Level Function of the ARF 
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The application is designed to be able to analyze information in any sensor w
which there is a logical connection.  This diagram also illustrates the separation between 
ith 
fication, the database used for the 
plica e a network connection can exist. 
the data and application.  With a simple modi
ap tion could be positioned anywher
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CHAPTER V – TESTING 
5.1 Introduction 
 
e rule-sets utilized.  The purpose of 
s of the rule-sets in 
 and 
Parameters 
yze the fuzzy threat level generated with several 
 
ental parameters will remain the same 
throughout the testing process.  For each case study, four experiments are to be executed.  
ach of these experiments requires two entities.  The first of which is a set of 
membership functions and the second is a set of rules.   
les in a more case 
by case natu
The experiments are to be executed in the following pattern as shown in table 5.1, below. 
 
Testing of the ARF threat evaluation system will be demonstrated in a series of 
case studies.  An experiment will be described in the next section to be executed for each 
case study.  While these case studies will be informative, it should be noted that the 
performance of this application is only as good as th
these tests is to gather evidence that will prove the effectivenes
question.  This is necessary because a side-by-side comparison of the Snort alert log
the ARF fuzzy threat level is not feasible.   
5.2 Testing Design 
 
Each case study will anal
different combinations of membership functions and rule-sets.  A separate dataset will be
utilized for each case study; however, the experim
E
There are two sets of membership functions.  The first set of membership 
functions is very general and would, theoretically, ship with the application.  The second 
set of membership functions is specific and takes measures to handle ru






Table 5.1: Experimental Parameters 
ership Function Rule-Set Output 
al  General O1
General Specific O2
Specific  General O3
Specific O4 
, an output of the alert dataset, 
and the final state of all application objects are recorded in this spreadsheet.  This serves 
as a long-term record of the experiment and will aid in analysis. 
5.3 Case Study 1 (All Experimental Data) 
 
This study represents a dataset collected in just under 27 days.  There are 
approximately two thousand alerts represented in the dataset ranging all levels of threat 
from low to high. 
5.3.1 Overview of Alerts 
 
ut 
hine.  These alerts can be as benign as someone searching for a directory 
structu
 to exploit a known vulnerability in an application 
or system. The outcome of these high threat vulnerabilities varies, but can lead to 




After the four experiments outlined above are executed on a dataset defined in 
each case study, data for analysis needs to be outputted for analysis.  This data will be 
written to an Excel spreadsheet.  The table shown above
This dataset represents alerts whose threat levels range from low to high.  Low 
threat alerts are typically defined as actions whose purpose is to collect information abo
the target mac
re of a target machine or can act as a first step to a more serious threat.  A high 
threat, however, is typically an attempt
e
ised file structure.   
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5.3.2 Rule-Sets Defined 
 
There are two separat out   
These sets can be seen in  in the appendices and will be discussed here in a 
general fashion.  Any set of rules defined in this application must implement the IRule 




function checks the bou the interval [0,1] and 
turns the threat leve
exist.  The general rule-set uses a 
single rule to inf
le because it must serve a wider spectrum of alerts.  Each alert is run through a series of 
tests that will increment  the threat level in the same fashion that is 
described above.  
e rule-sets that are used through the testing process.
their entirety
in   These two objects allow each rule-set to 
n with the same basic operations and allow effortless integration into ARF.  
Each set of rules has a general format that should be followed.  First, a variable 
threat is initialized to a floating point threat level between 0 and 1.0.  After that, the threat 
level is incremented or decremented based on a set of rules.  The rules use the 
FuzzyThreat object in question to make a determination of whether or not the threat lev
will be increased or decreased.  After all adjustments have been made for the a
nds of the threat to make sure it lies within 
re l for the set of alerts.  This format would be considered best 
practice, but the rule based inference mechanism used by ARF is flexible enough to cater 
to any specific changes for each rule.   
The specific rule-set defines a rule for every known signature.  These rules take 
into account the severity of the alert as well as the fuzzified input that is calculated in 
previous portions of the application.  Unknown alerts can be handled in a uniform 
fashion, but for testing purposes unknown alerts do not 







         this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) ||  
 
 // If a lot of different IPs are doing it in a low amount of      
      //  time...its probably new and needs to be looked at 
if(this.IsH




         this.IsMedHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
crement the threat level 
 if(this.IsLowMed(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) && this.IsLow(f.Timespan)) 
 
 (f
  threat -= 1
 
 threat = CheckBounds(threat); 




Some examples of rules used in this application are shown below.  The first 
example is the heart of the general rule-set, acting as a “catch-all” rule for the application.  
private double GRule(FuzzyThreat f) 
 double threat = startmed; 
 
 // If anything is a high threat, elevate the threat level 
 if(this.IsHigh(f.Occurances) ||  
         this.IsHigh(f.Timespan) ||  
         this.IsHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between) 
        ) 
  threat += .1; 
igh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) &&     
 threat += .5; 
 // If a lot of different IPs are doing over a large timespan  
// the threat should be elevated 
if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) && 
  threat += .2; 
 
 // If not a lot of people are doing it over not a lot of time,  
      // de
 threat -= .3; 
 
 // If it is not happening a lot, decrement the threat level 
if(this.IsLowMed .Occurances)) 
 . ; 
As shown in the code listed above, the threat level for an unknown alert is 
initialized to .5, run through a series of tests to increment or decrement the threat level, 
and checked to make sure the level remains within the interval (0,1).  While this rule m
seem verbose, it should be noted that it only needs to be implemented one time and not 
for every available alert.   
 The specific rules are generally much shorter, as shown in the code listing below.   
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//'WEB-CGI calendar access' 
// Low / No Threat 
private double WEB_CGI_CALENDAR_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
// http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=882 
{ 
 // This application does not exist on the system 








private double WEB_MISC_INVALID_HTTP_VERSION_STRING(FuzzyThreat f) 
{ 
 double threat = starthigh; 
 if(this.IsMedHi ( p_Frequency
+= 2
if(this.IsHigh(f.Timespan)) 
  threat += .1; 
 threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
 
} 
5.3.3 Membership Functions Defined 
There are two separate sets of membership functions used throughout the testing 
process.  The sets can be seen in their entirety in the appendices and will be discussed 




the rule defined for the specific alert created by the snort development team and 
numbered 882.  This threat exists as a flaw in an open-source calendar application, whic
does not exist on the target machine, therefore poses no threat.  However, the code show
below shows a reasonable rule for a specific alert.  
ISC Invalid HTTP Version String' (2570) 
/
h Threat 
gh f.Src_I )) 
  threat 
 
 . ; 
return threat; 
Note that this rule follows the same basic pattern defined previously, an initialization, a 
calculation, and a bounds checking mechanism.   
 
of membership functi
ication interface to ensure operability with the application.   
Each set of membership functions should also implement functionality to deal 
with every metric defined in design phase.  Function stubs are shown below: 
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private double MembershipOccurances(int occurances); 
private double MembershipTimeBetween(TimeSpan t); 
private double MembershipSrcIPFreq(double ip_fre); 
 
These function stubs take a crisp input and create a fuzzy output based on the operations 
performed within the function.   
The first set of membership functions to be described is the general membership 
functions.  These functions follow a straight line pattern show
private double MembershipTimespan(TimeSpan t); 
n below in figure 5.1.  In 
is example, the maximum threat level plateaus at 0.8. th
 
Figure 5.1: Trend for Set of General Membership Functions 
The only variation in the general trend shown in figure 5.1 is the boundary where 
the highest threat starts and the subsequent slope of the line that is calculated from the 
two points.   
For the specific set of membership functions, other graph structures were used 
5.3.4 Experimental Results 
 
described in section 5.2 of this document.   
and are described in figures 4.4 – 4.7. 
The output of each experiment is shown below, in table 5.2, in the format 
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Table 5.2: Experimental Results of Case Study 1 (Entire Alert Log) 
Experiment Number Membership Function Rule Set Fuzzy Thre
 
at Level 
1 General General 0.63 
2 General Specific 0.51 
4 Specific Specific 0.38  
The results of this case study show a declining threat level for the first two 
experiments and similar threat levels for the third and fourth experiments.  The varying 
property for the third and fourth experiments is the rule-set and the similarity of the fuzzy 
threat levels would indicate that a general rule set may be all that is necessary for an 
effective analysis of data for this mix of results.  These results, while unexpected, may 
serve to simplify the customization process of ARF over a series of sensors.   
5.4 Case Study 2 (Low Threat Dataset) 
 
This case study represents all alerts that are deemed “low threat” that exist in the 
dataset collected for case study 1.  As previously stated, these threats are considered to 
interrogate a system rather than compromise.   
All alerts that were deemed as low threats were placed into a separate local 
database that represents a sensor with all low threat alerts.  This database will be used to 
simulate a remote sensor.  The output of the experiment on a set of alerts that represents a 
low threat is shown below in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Experimental Results of Case Study 2 (Low Threat Alerts) 
 
Experiment Number Membership Function Rule Set Fuzzy Threat Level 
1 General General 0.5 
3 Specific General 0.37 
5.3.5 Analysis 
 
2 General Specific 0.24 
3 Specific General 0.4 
4 Specific Specific 0.22  
 
 62
The outputs of this experiment show that the dominant experimental entity in th
he similarity of the Fuz
is 
case study is the rule-set.  Notice t zy Threat Levels in experiments 
 exist in 
ow 
 
one and three as well as two and four.  This leads to the conclusion that the membership 
functions are not as important and could possibly be neglected as a primary area of 
research.  However, another case is also possible. These results could be grouped in this 
particular fashion because the specific rule set has the capability to properly categorize 
threats that have been considered low. 
5.5 Case Study 3 (Medium Threat Dataset) 
 
This case study represents all alerts that are deemed “medium threat” that
the dataset collected for case study 1.  All medium threat alerts from case study 1 were 
copied into a local database that represents a sensor with a medium threat level.  The 
output of the experiment on a set of alerts that represents a medium threat is shown bel
in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Experimental Results of Case Study 3 (Medium Threat Alerts) 
Experiment Number Membership Function Rule Set Fuzzy Threat Level 
1 General General 1 
2 General Specific 0.67 
3 Specific General 0.3 
4 Specific Specific 0.57  
 




case studies.  There is no obvious trend shown in this data and few conclusions can be
drawn from this case study.  The proximity of the outputs with varying membership 
functions in experiment two and four could serve to solidify the assumption that a general
membership function maybe be utilized to categorize alerts.  The amount of difference 
between the second and fourth experiment (.1) is relatively high to make this assumpt
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based on this study alone.  Based on this case study, it can be inferred that a different 
approach to medium threat alerts should be investigated in the future.  
5.6 Case Study 4 (High Threat Dataset) 
This case study represents all alerts that are deemed “high threat” that exist in the 
dataset collected for case study 1.  All high threat alerts from case study 1 were copied 
into a local database that represents a sensor with a high threat level.  The output of the 
experiment on a set of alerts that represents a high threat is shown below in table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Experimental Results of Case Study 4 (High Threat Alerts) 
Experiment Number Membership Function Rule Set Fuzzy Threat Level 
 
 
1 General General 0.4 
2 General Specific 0.8 
4 Specific Specific 0.7 
 
Once again, it can be seen from the results that fuzzy threat levels group together 
based on the rule-set in question.  This follows the trend shown in case study 2.  These 
results could be grouped in this particular fashion because the specific rule set has the 
capability to properly categorize threats that have been considered high.  While the 
difference in output levels for the second and fourth experiments is relatively high, .1, it 
should be noted that they both reside within the interval defined as high.   
5.7 Final Analysis 
 
Boundaries for low threats have been defined as a threat level of 0 < threat ≤ .33.  
Medium and high threats follow the same pattern: .33 < threat ≤ .66 and .66 < threat < 
.99, respectively.  It could be assumed that the optimal combination of rule-sets and 
3 Specific General 0.43 
. 
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membership functions would be the combination that, over all experiments, would show 
an increase in threa
two separate experim nts that follow this pattern.  The first of which is experiment 2 that 
used a general membership function and a specific set of rules.  The second is experiment 
4 that used a specific set of m






Figure t levels of the medium dataset 
do n
of a successful test.  All 
expected values meet the actual values and the escalating threat level across datasets 
t level from high threat dataset.  There are 
e
the low threat dataset to the 













re 5.2: Experiment 2 Data (General Membership Functions, Specific Rule-Set) 
All Low Med High 
Dataset
5.2 shows a desired trend in data, however the threa
ot fall within the range of (.33,.66].  
Figure 5.3, shown below, has all the characteristics 
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sho
set of rules is the optimal situation for ARF to function effectively.   











All Low Med High
Figure 5.3: Experim mbership Functions, Specific Rule-Set) 
 
slightly low
roughly in the m
 
Dataset
ent 4 Data (Specific Me
The experimental results depicted in Figure 5.3, above, show a threat level that is 
er than in Figure 5.2.  The low threats as well as the high threat datasets are 
iddle of the range that was expected.   
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CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The ARF threat evaluation system was developed as an application layer fuzzy 
alysis tool.  Specifically, the applicatio
 
logic an n examines the alert logs of multiple 
sensors and uses a rule-based fuzzy logic infere
a senso e design called 
for an application that could be tuned 
existing knowledge of Snort signatures.  The 
entities, one for all front end database and GUI functionality and another entity dedicated 
to the fuzzy logic engine.  The brain of th
mem t the 
more specific the m ns and rule-sets are, the more accurate the output of 
the application becom
area e 
boundaries set within each m
system stems could drastically 
reduce or elim




publicly available at www.nessus.org can test the vulnerability of a system for a specific 
alert.  These scripts are used at the kernel level to test the vulnerability of a system and if 
the vulnerability does not exist, Snort would not log the alert.  While this topic is not 
nce engine to generate a level of threat in 
r.  ARF is designed to be scalable, portable, and customizable.  Th
to any environment by someone who has an 
design also dictated two separate software 
e fuzzy logic engine resides in a set of 
bership functions and a set of rules.  Through experimentation, it was found tha
embership functio
es.  This conclusion, while somewhat intuitive, leads to the first 
 of future research.  A non-probabilistic learning system that can change th
embership function could be developed.  A similar learning 
 could be implemented for a set of rules.  These learning sy
inate customization in the application.  With these systems in place ARF 
sonnel.   
interesting area of research that would improve the reliability of this 
tion is the use of the Nessus Attack Scripting Language (NASL).  Existing script
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dire
reduce eed up the fuzzy logic process within 
AR
 ensor.  Further 
wor d 
attacks cement would essentially 
turn ly a 
robust  network based system.   
 ing 
time to
method from the fuzzy logic engine.  A dynamic 
programming approach could possibly be implemented in this application to only analyze 
new alerts within the MySQL log.  This method of storing results for small portions of 
data to be looked up later, instead of being recalculated, could radically decrease 
processing time in the application. 
ctly related to fuzzy logic, the outcome of this Snort enhancement would work to 
the MySQL storage space necessary and sp
F.   
In the current state, ARF calculates a threat level for a single s
k could be done to correlate alerts across multiple sensors to check for distribute
 and give a threat level for an entire network.  This enhan
 Snort into a hybrid intrusion detection system, giving security personnel not on
host based system but also a
With any application, as the amount of data increases the amount of process
 analyze the data also increases.  In the future it will be necessary to adopt a new 
 of storing and calculating results 
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APPENDIX I – ESTI G DOCUMENTS 
AllAlerts.xls
is docu t serves a log for th experime tal outputs f case study 1.  Ther are six 
parate e  workshee ssociated with this file to be named and described below. 
Totals 
is work t shows t ut of l four ex riments for this case study 
xperim al Outpu   
enerate 18/2006 2 PM   









1 Gen General 0.63
2 Gen Specific 0.51
3 Spe General 0.37
4 Spe Specific 0.38















   8 
35 
7 



















Th men s a e n  o e 
se xcel ts a
Th shee he outp al pe
E ent ts 









Experiment 1 – Application State 
S












2 10 45 1 77.15 4 
3 262 9 1 13.10 15
4 9 42 1 4.50 16 
5 6 3 1 3.00 882
6 1 0 1 1.00 1002
7 99 20 1 14.14 1070 
8 6 
 
35 1 6.00 1112 
9 18 21 1 6.00 1113 
10 102 20 1 14.57 1248 
11 102 20 1 14.57 1288 
12 2 
2 
14 1 2.00 
 
1671 
13 10 20 1 14.57 1807 
14 61 6 1 1.27 1852 
15 187 0 1 6.93 2570 
16 2 1 1 2.00 3463 
17 2 1 1 2.00 3813 
      
      
F    
S
Number Occurances Se freque
0.28 
ween S
1 0.31 0.80 1.00 2 
2 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 4 
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Experiment 2 – Application State 







Between (seconds) Signature 
1 1 1.50 50 2 
2 3 1 77 4 
3 2 1 13.10 15 
4 9 1 .50 44 16 
5 6 1 00 10 882 
6 1 1 .00 0 1002 
7 99 1 .14 8 1070 
15
4 0.73 0.80 1.00 0.63 16 
5 0.52 0.12 1.00 0.45 882
6 0.17 0.10 1.00 0.22 1002
7 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1070 
8 0.52 0.80 1.00 0.80 1112 
9 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1113 
10 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1248 
11 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1288 
12 0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 1671 
13 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 1807 
14 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.25 1852 
15 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 2570 
16 0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 3463 
17 0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 3813 
      
      
F    
Threat 
Number Level Signature    
1 0.5 2    
2 1 4    
3 1 15    
4 0.6 16    
5 0.1 882    
6 0.1 1002    
7 1 1070    
8 0.7 1112    
9 0.8 1113    
10 1 1248    
11 1 1288    
12 0.1 1671    
13 1 1807    
14 0.6 1852    
15 1 2570    
16 0.1 3463    
















8 6 35 1 6.00 35 1112 
9 18 21 1 6.00 7 1113 
10 102 20 1248 
11 102 20 1 14.57 36 1288 
14 1 2.00 1671 
13 102 1 57 07 
4 185
15 187 0 1 .93 2570 
16 2 1 1 .00 3463 
17 2 1 1 .00 3813 
      
      
 Data    
ranc ri
 IP Average Time 
g
1 0.31 .80 .28 2 
2 0.80 .80 .80 4 
3 0.80 .80 .80 15 
4 0.73 0.80 1.00 0.63 58 16 
5 0.52 0.12 1.00 0.45 11 882 
0.10 1.00 0.22 10 1002 
 1.00 0.80 21 1070 
8 0.52 .80 1.00 0.80 80 1112 
9 0.80 .80 1.00 0.80 80 1113 
10 0.80 .80 1.00 0.80 20 1248 
11 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1288 
12 0.24 0. 1671 
13 0.80 0.80 1807 
14 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.25 0.40 1852 
15 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.11 2570 
16 0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 3463 
17 0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 3813 
       
       
Fuzzy Threat Level Data     
Number 
Threat 
Level Signature     
1 0.2 2     
2 0.4 4     
3 0.6 15     
4 1 16     
5 0 882     
6 0.1 1002     
7 0.6 1070     
8 0.6 1112     
9 0.8 1113     
10 0.8 1248     
11 0.4 1288     
12 0.1 1671     
13 0.6 1807     
 1 14.57 36 












Fuzzy Threat  
ty 
Src
frequency Between SiNumber Occu es Timespan Seve nature 
0 1.00 0 0.80 
0 1.00 0 0.12 








10 1.00 0.33 0.10 
1.00 0.80 0.20 
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14 0.1 1852     
2570     
3463    
17 0.7 3     
 Experiment 3 – Ap







Betwee conds) Signature 
32 1 1.50 50 2 
77.15 
 1 15 
4 9 4.50 44 16 
5 6 3.00 10 882 
6 1 1.00 0 1002 
7 99 20 1 14.14 8 1070 
35 1 6.00 35 1112 
21 1 6.00 7 1113 
0 1 14.57 36 1248 
11 102 1 14.57 36 1288 
12 2 1 2.00 7 1671 
13 102 1 14.57 36 1807 
14 61 6 1852 
15 187 0 2570 
1 1 2.00 0 3463 
1 1 2.00 0 81  
     
   
Fu eat Data     





1 0.02 0.20 1 0 0.00 1.00 2 
2 1.00 0.20 1 0 0.20 1.00 4 
 0.20 1 0 0.20 0.95 15 
 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.46 6 
 0 1 0 82
6 0.01 1.00 1 0.00 1.00 1002 
7 0.97 0.20 1 0.20 0.91 1070 
8 0.03 0.20 1 0.00 0.20 1112 
9 0.09 0.20 1 0 0.00 0.20 1113 
10 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.91 1248 
0.20 1.00 0.20 0.91 1288 
. 0.00 1.00 1671 
1.00 0.20 0.91 1807 
14 0.35 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.67 1852 
15 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.00 1.00 2570 
6 0. 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3463 
7 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3813 
       
15 1 




























1 1.27 20 
































    
t Level Data   
at Level Signature    
1 0.4 2    
 0 4   
3 0.3 15    
4 0.4 16    
5 0.4 882    
6 0.4 1 02    
7 0.3 1 70    
1112    
1113    
0 0 1248   
11 0.3 1288    
12 0.4 1671    
13 0.3 1807    
14 0.5 1852    
15 0.5 2570    
3463    
3813     
eriment 4 – A plication State 
 







1 3 32 1 1.50 50 2 
2 1003 45 1 15 42 4 
3 1 13.10 13 15 
4 1 4.50 44 16 
5 1 3.00 10 882 
6 1 1.0 0 1002 
7 1 14. 8 1070 
8 6 1 .0 1112 
9 18 1 00 1113 
10 102 1 4.57  1248 
11 102 1 .57  1288 
12 2 1 1671 
13 102 20 1807 
14 61 6 1852 
 0 1 6.93 2570 
16 2 1 1 2.00 3463 
7 2 1 1 2 1
      
      
Fuzzy Th Data    





 0.20 1.00 0.00 2 































 262 9 
 9 42 








0 35 6 35 








 1 14.57 36 
1 1.27 20 










1 0.02 1.00 
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2 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 4 
 1 0.20 1 0.20 15 
4 0.05 0.20 1 0.00  16 
5 0.03 0.99 1 0.00  882 
6 0.01 1.00 1 0.00  1002 
7 0.97 0.20 1.00 0.20 1070 
8 0.03 0.20 1.00 0.00 1112 
0.20 1.00 0.00 1113 
10 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.91 1248 
0.20 1.00 0.20 1288 
12 0.01 1.00 1.00 1671 
13 1.00 0.20 1.00 1807 
14 0.35 0.20 1.00 1852 
15 1.00 0.54 1.00 2570 
16 0.01 1. 3463 
 1.00 1.00 0.00 3813 
    
   
Fuzzy Th t Level D    
Number T t Level Signature    
1 0 2    
2 0.1 4    
3 0 15    
16    
5 0 882    
 0 1002   
7 0.6 1070    
8 0.3 1112    
9 0.3 1113    
10 0.5 1248    
11 0.2 1288    
1671    
1807     
1852    
15 0.7 2570   
16 0.7 3463   
17 0.7 3813   
HighThreatExperiment.xls 
Totals 
Experimental Outputs  
Generated: 4/18/2006 3:4









1 Gene General 0.4
2 Gene l Specific 0.8
3 Specific General 0.43
4 Specific Specific 0.7
1.00 






9 0.09 0.20 










    





4 1  
 
























Experiment 2 – Application State 
risp Threat Da    
 Occurances 
Timespa
(seconds  Severity 
P 
ency 
Average Time Between 
(seconds  ignature 
0 1 35 70 
1 0 63 
1 0 3813 
   
     
zzy Threat Da    
Number Occurances Timespan Severity 
Src IP 
frequency Average Time Between Signature 
1 0.80 0.80 2570 
0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 3463 
0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 13 
      
 
zzy Threat Level Data    
mber Threat L Signature   
1 2570    
3463    
3813    
– Applic ion State 






1 187 6.93 25






    
  
Fu ta  




      
Fu  
Nu evel  
1  
2 0.1  
3 0.1  
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xperiment 3 – App ation State
 
mber Occuran  
Timespan




187 0 1 6.93 35 70 
2 1 1 2.00 0 63 
2 1 1 2.00 0 13 
       





01 0 0.00 1.00 
 0 0.00 1.00 
  
  
uzzy Threat Level Data  
umber hreat Level Signature   
 2570    
 3463  
 







0 1 6.93 35 2570 
1 2.00 3463 
2 2.00 
  
     
zzy Threat Da    
mber Occuran Timespan Seve  S frequen
Average Time 
Between ature 
0.80 1.00 0.80 0.11 2570 
0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 3463 
0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 3813 
    
  
zzy Threat Level Data   




Severity Src IP frequency
1 187 











Fu ta  




   
     
Fu   
Nu evel   
1     
2     
3     
E lic  
Crisp Threat Data    
Nu ces
 















1 1. 0 1.00 2570 
2 0. 1.0 1.00 3463 
3 0.01 1.0 1.00 3813 
     
     
F    







 3 0.4 3813  
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Experiment 4 – Appli n State
isp Threat Dat    
s 
Timespan 




0 1 6.93 35 570 
1 1 2.00 0 463 
1 1 2.00 0 813 
    
    
zzy Threat Da    
Number Occurances Timespan  
Average Time 
Between Signature 
1 1.00 0 1.00 2570 




zzy Threat Level Data    
mber 
at 
vel Signature   
70    
 .7 463    

















4 Speci Specific 0.57
eriment 1 – A pl ation State




Src IP Average Time 
etween (seconds) Signature 
1 99 2 1070 
 20 1 14.57 36 1248 
3 102 1 14 36 1807 
    
    
zzy Threat Data     
catio  







   
   
Fu ta  
Severity Src IP frequency









   





1 0.7 25  
2 0 3  
3 0 3  
 
MedT reatExpe iment.xls 
To
ental ts  








Exp p ic  
Cr a   
econds) Severity frequency B






   
Fu
 81
Number curances espan S erity 
S
fr  
A ge Time 
B een S re 
 0 1.00 0.80 0.21 1070 
 .80 .80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1248 
 .80 .80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1807 
     
     
hreat Le     
mber 
t 
   
    
    
    
Experiment 2 – Application State 







Between (seconds) Signature 
 1 14.14 8 1070 
1 14.57 36 1248 
1 14.57 36 1807 
    
    
Fuzzy Threat Data     





1 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.21 1070 
2 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1248 
3 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1807 
       
       
Fuzzy Threat Level Data     
Number 
Threat 
Level Signature    
1 0.6 1070     
2 0.8 1248     
3 0.6 1807     
 
Experiment 3 – Application State 









1 99 20 1 14.14 8 1070 
2 102 20 1 14.57 36 1248 
3 102 20 1 14.57 36 1807 
       















1 1 1070 
2 1 1248 
3 1 1807 
Crisp Threat Data  
(seconds) Number Occura
1 99 20 
2 102 20 
3 102 20 
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1 0.97 0.20 .20 0.91 1070 
2 1.00 0.20 .20 0.91 1248 
3 1.00 0 1.00 0.20 0.91 1807 
     
     
Fuzzy     
Number Signature    
1 0.3     
2     
3     
Experiment 4 – Application State 
Crisp T     
Number nces 
Timespan 




1 99 20 1 14.14 8 1070 
2 102 1 14.57 36 1248 
3 .57 36 1807 
   
  




1 0.20 0.91 1070 
2 0.20 0.91 1248 
3 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.91 1807 
  
   
Fuzzy   
Number ure    
1     
2 0.5     
3 0.6 1807     
M 
  
Rule Fuzzy Threat 
ral 
   



















102 20 1 14
    
     
Threat Data   
Occurances Timespan Severity Src IP frequency 
Av
Be
0.97 0.20 1.00 
0.20 1.00 1.00 
0.20 
     
    
reat Level Data   Th














Function Numb r Set Level 
1 Gene General 0.5
 83
2 General Specific 0.24
3 Specific General 0.4
4 Specific Specific 0.22
Experiment 1 – Application State 
Crisp T   
Number Signature 
1 10 882 
2 35 1112 
3 36 1288 
4 1671 
5 61 1852 
     
   
Fuzzy Threat Data  
Number Timespan Severity frequency Between Signature 
1 0.52 0.12 1.00 0.45 0.11 882 
2 0.80 0.80 1112 
3 0.80 88 
4 
5 0.80 2 
   
   
Fuzzy Threat evel  
Number Thr




5 0.6    
Crisp Threat Data  
Number Occurance ds) Signature 
1 6 882 
2 6 1112 
3 1288 
4 1671 
5 20 1852 
   
   
Fuzzy   
Number ture 
1 0.52 0.12 1.00 0.45 0.11 882 
2 0.52  1.00 0.80 0.80 1112 
hreat Data   
Time







6 3 1 3.00 
35 1 6.00 6 
102 20 1 14.57 
2 14 1 2.00 7 
6 1 1.27 20 
  
    
   
Src IP Average Time 
 Occurances 
0.52 0.80 1.00 
 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 12
0.24 0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 1671 
 0.25 0.40 1850.80 1.00 
    
    
 L Data    
 eat Level Signature    
882
0.7 1112     
1288     
    1671 
1852  
Experiment 2 – Application State 
   
Average Time 
s (seconds) Severity frequency Between (secon
0 
Timespan Src IP 
3 1 3.00 1
35 1 6.00 35 
102 20 1 14.57 36 
7 2 14 1 2.00 
.27 61 6 1 1
    
    
Threat Data   
 Occurances Timespan Severity frequency 
e 
Between Signa







   
Fuzzy Thr
Number Threat Level  
1 0  
2   
3   
4   
5  




3 102 36 1288 
4 1 







3 0.91 1288 
4 0.00 1.00 1671 
5 0.67 1852 
   
      
Fuzzy 
Number   
1   
2 0.4     
3   
4  
5 0.5 1852     
Crisp Threat Data  
Number ) Signature 
1 882 
2 6 1112 
0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 1288 
0.24 1671 
1852 
 0.10 1.00 0.33 0.10 
0.80 0.80 1.00 0.25 0.40 
     
    
eat Level Data     
 Signature   
882    
 
0.6 1112   
0.4 1288   
1   0.1 167
0.1 1852    
Experiment 3 – Application State 
hreat Data    
span Src IP Average Time 
 Occurances (seconds) Severity frequency Between (seconds) S
882 
Time
6 3 1 3.00 10 
6 35 1 6.00 35 
20 1 14.57 
2 14 1 2.00 7 167
1 1.27 20 185
     
     
Threat Data    
 Occurances Timespan Severity frequency Between Signature 
Src IP Average Time 
0.99 1.00 1.00 882 
0.03 0.20 0.20 1112 
0.00 
1.00 0.00 
1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 
0.01 1.00 1.00 
0.35 0.20 1.00 0.00 
    
 
Th     reat Level Data 
Threat 
Level Signature  
0.4 882   
1112 
0.3 1288   
0.4 1671    
Experiment 4 – Application State 
   
Timespan Src IP Average Time 
 Occurances (seconds) Severity frequency Between (seconds
6 3 1 3.00 10 
35 1 6.00 35 
 85
3 102 1288 
4 2 14 2.00 7 1671 
5 61 20 1852 
   
  
Fuzzy Thr   
Number Occurances Timespan Severity frequency Between Signature 
1 1.00 882 
2 0.20 1112 
3 1288 
4 1671 
5 1.00 0.00 0.67 1852 
  
  
Fuzzy     
Number   
1     
2 0.3 1112     
3   
4   
5  
 
20 1 14.57 36 
1 
6 1 1.27 
    
     
eat Data   
Src IP Average Time 
0.03 0.99 1.00 0.00 
0.20 1.00 0.00 0.03 
1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.91 
1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 
0.35 0.20 
     
     
Threat Level Data 
Threat 
ure  Level Signat
0 882 
0.2 1288   
  0.2 1671 
0.4 1852    
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APPENDIX II – SOURCE CODE 
ARF_Main.cs  
using System; 
sing ystem Drawiu S . ng; 
using System.Collections; 







 /// <summary> 
 /// Summary descri
 /// </summary> 
 public class ARF_M
 { 
  /// </summar
  public ARF_M
  { 
   // 
   // Required for Windows Form Designer support 
   // 
   Initia
r the Form Object 












ption for Form1. 
ain : System.Windows.Forms.Form 
  /// <summary> 





   // 
   // 
  } 
   
  /// <summary> 
 ///  Preliminary Setup fo 
  /// </summary> 
s e)   private void Form1_Load(object sender, System.EventArg
  { 
teNetworkListBox();    Popula
   treeView1.ExpandAll(); 
    
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
 ///  Starts the threaded synchr 
sensors listed in hosts.
 87
  /// </summary> 
  private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  { 
Thread startSync = new Thread(new ThreadStart(StartHostConnect)); 
   startSync.Start(); 
  } 
s.Text = ""; 
e.Now.ToString() +"\r\n"; 
Text += "Ending Sync " +  
ring() +"\r\n"; 
ort databases to local MySQL Server 
  /// <param name="SensorN to  
ocal
> 
gle(MySqlConnection connection, string  
//   to be copied locally 
   //   --> events ta
   //   --> iphdr tab
   //  Start the tran
//  locally 
n and return true 
  //  if the transaction fails, rollback the  
//  tr
 
   // Ope
   // Create insert snapshot sql statement 
   // Save Resu
  // clo
 
  // Open local connection 
o event monitor 
 connection     
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Starts the threaded synchronization process 
  /// </summary> 
  public void StartHostConnect() 
  { 
   //txtSyncStatu
txtSyncStatus.Text = "Starting Sync " +  
System.DateTim
    
MySqlHostConnect(); 
   txtSyncStatus.
System.DateTime.Now.ToSt
 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Sync a remote sn
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="connection">Connection String For Remote  
MySQL Server</param> 
ame">Alias of Remote Server 
database</param> reference in l
  /// <returns>True if the host syncs</returns
  private bool SnycSin
SensorName) 
  { 
  // Find Timestamp of Last Alert Logged Locally for Sensor 
  // Create transactions of the alerts from Remote Database  
ble 
le 
saction to copy remote records  
on succeeds, commit the     //  If the transacti
     //  transactio
 
ansaction and return false 
n remote connection 
   // execute statement 
ltset 
 se connection 
 
   // insert saved result int
   // close Local
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   // ************************************************** 
    FIND timestamp of last alert logged locally 
  // ************************************************** 
n LocalConnection =  
  
tTime = "SELECT MAX(timestamp) from  
RE sensor_alias = '" + 
   
   
   
ction); 
Command.ExecuteReader(); 
ateTime = tempDateTime.AddSeconds(- 
1.0);    
MM-dd 
se 
LastTime = ""; 
ime != "") 
  else 
= ""; 
    
.Close(); 
******************************* 
MOTE ALERTS TO BE COPIED 
*********************** 
----- 
ure, e.timestamp, '"; 
   //
 
   MySqlConnectio
this.MySqlConnect(); 
 LocalConnection.Open(); 
   string LastAler
event "; 
LastAlertTime  += WHE
SensorName + "'"; 
   string LastTime = ""; 
string Options = ""; 
 
MySqlCommand LastTimestampCommand = new  
MySqlCommand(LastAlertTime,LocalConne
   MySqlDataReader LastTimestampReader; 
   LastTi
LastTimestamp
mestampReader =  
    
   MySQL.Data.Types.MySqlDateTime tempMySqlDate; 
   System.DateTime tempDateTime; 
   while(LastTimestampReader.Read()) 
   { 
    tempMySqlDate =  
LastTimestampReader.GetMySqlDateTime(0); 
 
    if(!tempMySqlDate.IsNull) 
    { 
     tempDateTime =  
tempMySqlDate.GetDateTime(); 
     tempD
     LastTime = tempDateTime.ToString("yyyy- 
HH:mm:ss"); 
    } 
    el
     
   } 
    
   if(LastT
Options= " where timestamp >= '"+LastTime+ "'";     
 
    Options 
 
   LocalConnection
   LastTimestampReader.Close(); 
 
   //***************
   //      SELECT ALL RE
   //***********************
 
--------------------------------    // -----
   //EVENTS table 
   // --------------------------------










roper format in remote database 
  
   
false; 
   while (myRea
Time d =  
teTime(3); 
stem.DateTime dt = d.GetDateTime(); 
sertStatements.Add("INSERT IGNORE INTO 
sid, cid, signature, 
alias) VALUES (" + 
myReader.GetString(0) + ", " + 
myReader.GetString(1) + ", " + 
.GetString(2) + ", '" + 
', '" + 
GetString(4) + "')"); 
etString(0) + 
" AND cid= "+ myReader.GetString(1) + ")"; 







 home_alerts.iphdr i  
ring t = ""; 
y += SensorName + "' FROM event e " +  
s; 
RE 0=1 ";    string pkey = " WHE
   ArrayList In
      
sertStatements = new ArrayList(); 
   MySqlCommand myCommand 
MySqlCommand(mySelectQuery,conn
 
   co
   
   
   // make sure p
   try 
   { 
    myReader = myCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
 } 
catch 
   { 
    return 




   { 
    MySQL.Data.Types.MySqlDate
myReader.GetMySqlDa






dt.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss") + "
myReader.
     
pkey += "OR (sid = " + myReader.G
   } 
myReader.Close(); 
   connection.Close(); 
 
   // ----------------------
   //
  // -------------------------------------  
 
   
Query2 = "SELECT i.sidstring mySelect
i.ip_src, i.ip_dst, i.ip_ver, i.ip_hlen,
mySelectQuery2 += i.i
ip_flags,i.ip_off,i.
mySelectQuery2 += i.ip_csum FROM
" + pkey; 
 
   st
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   ArrayList InsertStatementsIP = new ArrayList(); 
tion); 
   MySqlDataReader der2; 
atabase 
   myReader2 = myCommand2.ExecuteReader(); 
  } 
 
  
   }
tor.iphdr (sid, 
ip_proto, ip_csum, sensor_alias) VALUES ("; 
t+= myReader2.GetString(0) + ", " + 
 + ", " + 
 
tring(9) + ", " + 
String(10) + ", " + 
tString(11) + ", " + 
tString(12) + ", " + 




ata to local machine 
   // *********
    
   LocalConnect
 
   MySqlCommand
LocalConnection.CreateCommand(); 
   MySqlTransac
 
   // Start a l
 
   MySqlCommand myCommand2 = new  
and(mySelectQuery2,connecMySqlComm
   connection.Open(); 
myRea
    
   // make sure proper format in remote d
   try 
   { 
 
 
   catch 
  { 
  return false; 
 
 wh  ile (myReader2.Read())  
   { 
t = "INSERT IGNORE INTO arf_moni
cid, ip_src, ip_dst, ip_ver, ip_hlen, ip_tos, 
ip_len, ip_id, ip_flags, ip_off, ip_ttl, 
 
myReader2.GetString(1) + ", " + 
myReader2.GetString(2) + ", " + 
myReader2.GetString(3) + ", " + 
myReader2.GetString(4)
myReader2.GetString(5) + ", " + 
myReader2.GetString(6) + ", "; 
     
 +t+= myReader2.GetString(7) + ", "






     
= ")"; t+
    InsertStatementsIP.Add(t); 
   } 
   myReader2.Close(); 
   connection.Close();
 
****   // ****************************************
   //           Copy All new d
************************************** 
ion.Open(); 




   myTrans = LocalConnection.BeginTransaction(); 
n 
ements) 
 LocalCommand.CommandText = s; 
    LocalCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 InsertStatementsIP) 
{ 
d.CommandText = s; 
   
   
   
   }
    
    ion  
failed...rolled back\r\n"; 
if (myTrans.Connection != null) 
nsaction  
ack\r\n"; 
bug.WriteLine("An exception of 
 was 
roll back the transaction."); 
    } 
     
Debug.WriteLine("An exception of type " + 
e.GetType() + " was encountered while 
inserting the data."); 
 
    Debug.WriteLine("No records were written to  
database."); 
 txtSyncStatus.Text += "An exception of type " + 
e.GetType() + " was encountered\r\n"; 
 
    return false; 
   
   
   { 
    LocalConnect
   // Must assign both transaction object and connectio
   // to Command object for a pending local transaction 
calConnection;    LocalCommand.Connection = Lo
   LocalCommand.Transaction = myTrans; 
 
   try 
   { 
    foreach(string s in InsertStat
    { 
    
 
    } 
    foreach(string s in
    
     LocalComman
     LocalCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 } 
 myTrans.Commit(); 
 return true; 
 
   catch(Exception e) 
   { 
    try 
{ 
     myTrans.Rollback(); 
 txtSyncStatus.Text += "transact
    } 
    catch (MySqlException ex) 
    { 
     
     { 
      txtSyncStatus.Text += "tra
not roll bfailed...could 
 
De
type " + ex.GetType() + "
encountered while attempting to 






  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///   Connects to the specified RevTreeNode and  
///   synchronizes data if need be 
  /// </summary> 
/// <param name="m">The RevTreeNode of the sensor to  
synchronize</param> 
  private void ConnectSyncSingle(arf.RevTreeNode m) 
  { 
string conn = "SERVER=" + m.IP + "; DATABASE=" + 
m.DatabaseName + "; UID=" + m.DatabaseUser + "; 
PASSWORD=" + m.DatabasePassword + ";";   
       
   MySqlConnection SingleConnection =  
ConnectSingleMySql(conn); 
      
   if(SingleConnection != null) 
   { 
    //txtSyncStatus.Text += "connected\r\n"; 
    // Sync the databases 
    // change the icon 
             
    if(SnycSingle(SingleConnection, m.Alias)) 
    { 
     txtSyncStatus.Text += "success\r\n"; 
     m.ImageIndex = 0; 
     m.SelectedImageIndex = 0; 
    }  
    else 
   
     txtSyncStatus.Text += "synchronization  
fail
   
   } 
   
   { 
    txtSyncStatus.Text += "connection failure\r\n"; 
   } 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Connect and SNYC to all hosts listed for the  
///  site in hosts.xml 
  /// </summary> 
  private void MySqlHostConnect() 
  { 
   
   int count 
   string 
   foreach(TreeNode n in treeView1.Nodes) 
   { 
    i = 1; 
    count = n.Nodes.Count; 
    foreach(arf.RevTreeNode m in n.Nodes) 










message = "connecting to " + m.Alias + " 
@ " + n.Text + " " + i.ToString() + " of 
" + count.ToString() + "..."; 
      
txtSyncStatus.Text += (message); 
      ConnectSyncSingle(m); 
     i++; 
   
   }   
  } 
  
  
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Connect to a remote database 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="conn">The Connection string</param> 
/// <returns>Th
  private MySqlConnection ConnectSingleMySql(string conn) 
  {   
   try 
   {  
    MySqlConnection connection = new  
MySqlConnection(conn); 
    connection.Open(); 
    connection.Close(); 
    return connection; 
   } 
   catch 
   { 
    return null; 
   } 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Connects to the local mysql database 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <returns>The mysql connection object</returns> 
  private MySqlConnection MySqlConnect() 
  { 
string MyConString = "SERVER=localhost; 
   MySqlConnection connection = new  
MySqlConnection(MyConString); 
   return connection; 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Opens a form to add a new host 
  /// /
  privat k(object sender,  
System.EventArgs e) 
  { 
   AddHost Child = new AddHost(); 
   Child.ShowDialog();  
   PopulateNetworkListBox(); 
  } 
 }     
 e mysql connection object or  
null if connection is not available</returns> 
DATABASE=arf_monitor; UID=root; PASSWORD=XXXX;"; 
 
 < summary> 
e void menuItem4_Clic
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  /// <summary> 
  ///  Opens a form to add a new network 
  /// </summary> 
  private void menuItem5_Click(object sender,  
System.EventArgs e) 
  { 
   AddNetwork Child = new AddNetwork(); 
   Child.ShowDialog(); 
  } 
 
 
  /// <summary> 
 ///  Creates the Tree View object from the hosts.xml 
file, storing all pertinent  
///  information about each host in the RevTreeNode 
object 
  /// </summary> 
  private void PopulateNetworkListBox() 
  { 
   System.Xml.XmlDocument xmldoc = new XmlDocument(); 
   
   xmldoc.Load(xmlfilename); 
 
   treeView1.ImageList = this.NetworkImages; 
   XmlNodeList xmlnetworks =  
xmldoc.GetElementsByTagName("network"); 
   XmlNodeList xmlhosts; 
    
   System.Windows.Forms.TreeNode m; 
   System.Windows.Forms.TreeNode [] n; 
   System.Windows.Forms.TreeNode o; 
    
   string alias; 
   string ip; 
   string dbn; 
  
   str
 
   for(int i=0;i<xmlnetworks.Count;i++) 
   { 
    xmlhosts = xmlnetworks[i].ChildNodes; 
   osts.Count]; 
    for s.Count;j++) 
    {  
     // Each Host within a network 
          
   
nnerText;   
ip    = 
xmlhosts[j].ChildNodes[1].InnerText; 
dbn   = 
;   
xmlhosts[j].ChildNodes[3].InnerText;   
dbp   = 
xmlhosts[j].ChildNodes[4].InnerText;   
 string dbu; 
ing dbp; 
 n = new TreeNode[xmlh
(int j=0;j<xmlhost
  alias =  
xmlhosts[j].ChildNodes[0].I
xmlhosts[j].ChildNodes[2].InnerText
dbu   = 
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     o = new 
arf.RevTreeNode(alias,ip,dbn,dbu,dbp,1,1);  // Image Default:Off(Red) 
     n[j] = o; 
           
    } 
    m = new 
TreeNode(xmlnetworks[i].Attributes[0].Value,2,2,n); 
    treeView1.Nodes.Add(m); 
   } 
  } 
 
  private void ChangeRawHostAlertTable(object sender, 
System.Windows.Forms.TreeViewEventArgs e) 
  { 
   string sql = ""; 
   
sql += "SELECT e.sid, e.cid, e.timestamp, s.sig_sid 
ip_src, inet_ntoa(i.ip_dst) as ip_dest "; 
 
   sql += "FROM event e "; 
   sql += "INNER JOIN signature s "; 
   sql += "ON e.signature = s.sig_id inner join iphdr i  
using (sid,cid) "; 
   sql += "w
 
   RawAler
   .GetType().ToString() == "arf.RevTreeNode") 
   { 
 
    MySqlConnection conn = this.MySqlConnect(); 
    MySqlDataAdapter adapter = new  
MySqlDataAdapter(); 
    adapter.SelectCommand = new MySqlCommand(sql,  
conn); 
    adapter.Fill(RawAlertDataset); 
    //dataGrid1.DataSource = RawAlertDataset; 
   
 dataGrid1.SetDataBinding(RawAlertDataset,"Table"); 
    
    // Fuzzy Alert For Host 
    lblSensor_Network.Text =  
treeView1.SelectedNode.FullPath; 
    double d =  
arf.fuzzy.FuzzyEngine.HostThreatLevel(Raw 
AlertDataset,lstXMLOutput); 
    lblSensorThreat.Text = d.ToString("f"); 
   } 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Gets the string representation of the signature  
///   from the local MySQL Database 
  /// </summary> 
/// <param name="sigId">integer ID (in string  
as signature, s.sig_name, inet_ntoa(i.ip_src) as 
here e.sensor_alias = '" +  
treeView1.SelectedNode.Text + "' "; 
tDataset = new DataSet("event"); 
if(e.Node
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for at) of the signature in question</param> 
  ///
  publ string GetSnortSignatureName(string sigId) 
  { 
   string MyConString = "SERVER=localhost;  
DATABASE=arf_monitor; UID=root; PASSWORD=XXXX;"; 
   MySqlConnection LocalConnection = new  
MySqlConnection(MyConString); 
   LocalConnection.Open(); 
 
string GetSignatureName = "SELECT s.sig_name FROM 
signature s where sig_sid = " + sigId.ToString(); 
 
   string Si
   SqlC
MySqlCommand(GetSignatureName,LocalConnection); 
   MySqlDataReader GetSignatureReader; 
   GetSignatureReader =  
ExecuteReader(); 
   
   while(GetSignatureReader.Read()) 
   { 
    SigName = GetSignatureReader.GetString(0); 
   } 
   LocalConnection.Close(); 
   GetSignatureReader.Close(); 
 
   return SigName; 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Wrapper Function to call the Hex Encoding Functions 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="hexString">Hexidecimal String holding a  
packet payload</param> 
  /// <returns>a byte array represneting the Hexidecimal  
  public byte[] He
  { 
   int discarded; 
    
   byte[] byteArray =  
HexEncoding.GetBytes(hexString, out discarded); 
   return byteArray; 
 
  } 
  
  /// <summary> 
  /// Get the IP address of this computer in a.b.c.d format 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <returns>This Computers IP Address</returns> 
  private string GetMyIp() 
  { 
   string hostName = Dns.GetHostName(); 
   Console.WriteLine("Host Name = " + hostName); 
   IPHostEntry local = Dns.GetHostByName(hostName);     
   string ip = local.AddressList[0].ToString(); 
m
 <returns>string name of the signature</returns> 
ic static 
gName = ""; 




string in bytes</returns> 
xEncoder(string hexString) 
 97
   return ip; 
    




  /// <summary> 
  ///  Syncrhonizes a Single, selected sensor 
  /// </summary> 
  private void button6_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  { 
    Thread startSync = new Thread(new  
ThreadStart(StartSingleHostConnect)); 
    startSync.Start();  
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Start the thread to sync a single, selected host 
  /// </summary> 
  public void StartSingleHostConnect() 
  { 
   try 
   { 
   
   if(this.treeView1.SelectedNode.GetType().ToString()  
== "arf.RevTreeNode") 
   { 
   this.txtSyncStatus.Text = "Connecting to " +  
this.treeView1.SelectedNode.Text + "..."; 
  
 ConnectSyncSingle((arf.RevTreeNode)this.treeView1.SelectedNode); 
   } 
   
   } 
   tch 
   { 
    MessageBox.Show("Select a sensor"); 
   } 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///Runs the experiment as described in the testing section 
  /// </summary> 
  private void menuItem7_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  { 
   arf.fuzzy.FuzzyExperiment.Experiment(); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Opens an external link to www.snort.org to view more  
///   details of an alert 
  /// </summary> 
  private void ViewSignatureDetails(object sender,  
System.Windows.Forms.KeyPressEventArgs e) 
  { 




   int startnum = full.IndexOf("|"); 
 
   string num = full.Substring(++startnum, (full.Length- 
1)-startnum); 
    
   try 
   { 
    int i = int.Parse(num); 
System.Diagnostics.Process.Start(http://www.sno
rt.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid= + i.ToString() ); 
   } 
   catch 
  
    ure not found, is it in  
this format |10|?"); 
   } 
    
















 /// <summary> 
 /// Summary description for AddHost. 
 /// </summary> 
 public class AddHost : System.Windows.Forms.Form 
 { 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Required designer variable. 
  /// </summary> 
  private System.ComponentModel.Container components = null; 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Con
  /// / mmar
  public AddHost() 
  { 
   // 
   
   







 structor for the form object 
 < su y> 
// Required for Windows Form Designer support 
// 
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  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Clean up any resources being used. 
  /// </summary> 
  protected override void Dispose( bool disposing ) 
  { 
   if( disposing ) 
   { 
    if(components != null) 
    { 
     components.Dispose(); 
    }
   } 
   base.Dispose( disposing ); 
  } 
  /// <summary> 
  /// WRAPPER: Tests a connection to a remote database 
  /// </summary> 
  private void btnTest_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  {  
   TestDBConnection(); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Tests a connection to a remote database 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <returns
otherwise</returns> 
  private bool TestDBConnection() 
  { 
   lblSuc or.Gray; 
   try 
   { 
string MyConString = "SERVER=" + 
this.txtIP.Text + "; DATABASE=" + 
this.txtDBName.Text + "; UID=" + 
this.txtDBUser.Text + "; PASSWORD=" + 
this.txtDBPass.Text + ";"; 
 
    MySqlConnection connection = new  
MySqlConnection(MyConString); 
    connection.Open(); 
    connection.Close(); 
    lblSuccess.BackColor =  
System.Drawing.Color.Green; 
   } 
   catch 
   { 
    lblSuccess.BackColor =  
System.Drawing.Color.Red; 
    return false; 
   } 










  /// <summary> 
  ///Adds some default values to the form for debugging  
      /// purposes 
  /// </summary> 
  private void btnDebug_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  { 
   this.txtAlias.Text = "Thesis Box"; 
   this.txtIP.Text = "localhost"; 
   this.txtDBName.Text = "arf_monitor"; 
   is.t
   this.txtDBPass.Text = "donkeylips"; 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Sets up the form for data input 
  /// </summary> 
  private void Ad
  { 
   // Find Host ID's  
   // Bind Names to DropDown cboNetwork 
    
   System.Xml.XmlDocument hosts = new XmlDocument(); 
   hosts.Load(xmlfilename); 
   
   System.Xml.XmlNodeList nl =  
      
   cboNetwork.Items.Clear(); 
   foreach(System.Xml.XmlNode n in nl)     
   cboNetwork.Items.Add(n.Attributes["name"].Value); 
    
   cboNetwork.SelectedIndex = 0; 
  } 
 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Inserts entered data into hosts.xml 
  /// </summary> 
  private void InsertHostIntoXML() 
  { 
   System.Xml.XmlDocument xmldoc = new XmlDocument(); 
   
   xmldoc.Load(xmlfilename); 
    
   XmlElement newcatalogentry =  
xmldoc.CreateElement("host");   
 
   XmlElement firstelement =  
xmldoc.CreateElement("alias");      
   firstelement.InnerText = this.txtAlias.Text;                    
   newcatalogentry.AppendChild(firstelement); 
   
xmld ip");      
   secondelement.                 
   newcatalogentry.AppendChild(secondelement); 
   XmlElement thirdele
xmldoc.CreateElement("dbname");      
th xtDBUser.Text = "root"; 
dHost_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
hosts.GetElementsByTagName("network"); 
XmlElement secondelement =  
oc.CreateElement("
InnerText = this.txtIP.Text;  
ment =  
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   thirdelement.In BName.Text;                 
   newcatalogentry.AppendChild(thirdelement); 
   XmlElement fourthelemen
eElement("
   fourthelement.InnerText = this.                
   newcatalogentry.AppendChild(fourthelement); 
   XmlElement fifthelement =  
xmldoc.CreateElement("dbpass");      
   fifthelement.InnerText = this.txtDBPass.Text;                   
   newcatalogentry.AppendChild(fifthelement); 
 
   System.Xml.XmlNode refNode = null; 
   System.Xml.XmlNodeList nl =  
xmldoc.GetElementsByTagName("network"); 
   foreach(System.Xml.XmlNode n in nl) 
   { 
    if(n.Attributes["name"].Value ==  
(string)this.cboNetwork.SelectedItem) 
    { 
     refNode = n; 
     break; 
    } 
   } 
 
   refNode.AppendChild(newcatalogentry); 




   xmldoc.Save(fsxml); 
   fsxml.Close(); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Accepts the data entered into the form 
  /// </summary> 
  private void btnAccept_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
  { 
   DialogResult result; 
   if(!TestDBConnection()) 
result = MessageBox.Show("This Connection is 




   else 
    result = DialogResult.Yes; 
 
   if(result == DialogResult.Yes) 
    InsertHostIntoXML(); 
  
   this.Close(); 




t =  














 /// <summary> 
 /// Summary description for AddNetwork. 
 /// </summary> 
 public class AddNetwork : System.Windows.Forms.Form 
 { 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Required designer variable. 
  /// </summary> 
  private System.ComponentModel.Container components = null; 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Constructor for the form object 
  /// </summary> 
  public AddNetwork() 
  { 
   // 
   // Required for Windows Form Designer support 
   // 
   InitializeComponent(); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Clean up any resources being used. 
  /// / mmar
  protected overr
  { 
   if( disposing ) 
   { 
    if(components != null) 
    { 
     components.Dispose(); 
    } 
   
   base.Disp
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  WRAPPER: Adds the network to hosts.xml 
  /// </summary> 
  private void btnAddNetwork_Click(object sender,EventArgs e) 
  { 
   
   // Close 
   this.Close(); 
  } 
 
 < su y> 
ide void Dispose( bool disposing ) 
} 





  /// <summary> 
  ///  Actually adds the name to the hosts.xml file 
  /// </summary> 
  public void Add
  { 
   if(this.txtNetworkName.Text.Trim() != "" &&  
this.txtNetworkName.Text != null) 
   { 
    // Load Existing hosts.xml file 
    System.Xml.XmlDocument networks = new  
XmlDocument(); 
    networks.Load(xmlfilename); 
 
    me "network" 
    System.Xml.XmlNodeList nl =  
networks.GetElementsByTagName("network"); 
 
    // Create New XML Element 
    XmlElement newcatalogentry =  
networks.CreateElement("network"); 
    XmlAttribute newcatalogattr =  
networks.CreateAttribute("name"); 
    newcatalogattr.Value =  
this.txtNetworkName.Text; 
   
 newcatalo n y.Se
 
    //  Add XML element at end of node list 
networks.DocumentElement.InsertAfter(newcatalog
entry, networks.DocumentElement.LastChild); 
    
    //  Save the new XML file to disk 
FileStream fsxml = new 
FileStream(this.xmlfilename,FileMode.Truncate, 
FileAccess.Write, FileShare.ReadWrite); 
     
networks.Save(fsxml); 
    fsxml.Close(); 
   } 











 /// <summary> 
 ///  A custom TreeNode object that holds all applicable 
information about intrusion detection ///         sensors 
 /// </summary> 
NetworkToXML() 
//Create list of nodes with tag na
ge tr tAttributeNode(newcatalogattr); 
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 public class RevTreeNode : TreeNode 
 { 
  private string alias; 
  private string ip; 
  pri t stri
  private string 
  private string dbpass; 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  A name to call the sensor 
  /// </summary> 
  public string Alias 
  { 
   t{re
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  The IP address of the sensor in a.b.c.d format 
  /// </summary> 
  public string IP 
  { 
   get{return ip;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///Name of the MySQL database sensor information resides 
  /// </summary> 
  public string DatabaseName 
  
   get
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 




   get{retur
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Cleartext password for the user listed above 
  /// </summary> 




   
 
   
  /// <summary> 
  ///    Creates a Tree Node Object 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="a">Alias of the Node (shown in  
tree)</param> 
  /// <param name="ipaddr">IP address of the node</param> 
  /// <param name="dn">MySQL database name</param> 
va e ng dbname; 
dbuser; 








 get{return dbpass;} 
} 
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  /// <param name="du">MySQL database user</param> 
  /// <param name="dp">MySQL database password</param> 
  /// <param name="imageIndex">Index of the Image to use to  
represent the node</param> 
  /// <param name="SelectedImageIndex">Which Image is  
selected in the list</param> 
public RevTreeNode(string a, string ipaddr, string dn, 
string du, string dp, int imageIndex, int 
selectedImageIndex) 
  { 
   base.Text = a; 
   alias  = a; 
   ip     = ipaddr; 
   dbname = dn; 
   dbuser = du; 
   dbpass = dp; 
   base.ImageIndex = imageIndex; 
   base.SelectedImageIndex = selectedImageIndex; 







 public interface IFuzzification 
 { 
  FuzzyThreatCollection   MakeFuzzy(CrispThreatCollection i); 
  FuzzyThreat MakeFuzzy(CrispThreat c); 
  FuzzyThreatCollection GetFuzzyThreats(); 
 } 
 
 public interface IInferenceEngine 
 { 
  FuzzyThreatLevelCollection       
FuzzyInference(FuzzyThreatCollection i); 
  FuzzyThreatLevel           FuzzyInference(FuzzyThreat f); 
  FuzzyThreatLevelCollection GetFuzzyThreatLevel(); 
 } 
 
 public interface IDefuzzifier 
 { 
  double Defuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i); 
  double GetCrispOutput(); 
 } 
 
 public interface IRule 
 { 
  double FindFuzzyThreatLevel(FuzzyThreat f); 
 } 
 
 public interface IMath 
 { 
 106






 #region Crisp Threat Objects (CrispThreat, CrispThreatCollection) 
 
 public struct CrispThreat 
 { 
  #region Properties 
   
  private int occurances; 
  private System.TimeSpan timespan; 
  private int severity_multiplier; 
  private double src_ip_frequency; 
  private System.TimeSpan avg_time_between; 
  private int signature; 
 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Property Accessors 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Number of times an alert has been generated 
  /// </summary> 
  public int Occurances 
  { 
   get{return occurances;} 
   set{occurances = value;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  
  
  public Sy n Timespan 
  { 
   get{return timespan;} 
   set{ timespan=value;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  A future-use severity multiplier 
  /// </summary> 
  public int Severity_Multiplier 
  { 
   get{return severity_multiplier;} 
   set{ severity_multiplier=value;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// The frequency of IPs that are generating this alert 
  /// </summary> 
  public double Src_Ip_Frequency 
  { 




   get{return src_ip_frequency;} 
   set{src_ip_frequency=value;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  The Averate timespan between alerts 
  /// </summary> 
  public System.TimeSpan Avg_Time_Between 
  { 
   get{return avg_time_between;} 
   set{avg_time_between=value;} 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  The SNORT signature of the alert 
  /// </summary> 
  public int Signature 
  { 
   get{return signature;} 
   set{signature=value;} 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
   
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Creates a CrispThreat Object from scratch 
  /// </summary> 
public CrispThreat(int num_occurances, System.TimeSpan 
alert_avg_timespan, int severity_mult, System.TimeSpan 
average_time_between_attacks, int alert_signature, double 
source_ip_frequency) 
  { 
   occurances = num_occurances ; 
   timespan = alert_avg_timespan; 
   severity_multiplier = severity_mult; 
   src_ip_frequency = source_ip_frequency; 
   avg_time_between = average_time_between_attacks; 
   signature = alert_signature; 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Creates a copy of a crisp threat object 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="t">The CrispThreat Object to Copy</param> 
  public CrispThreat(CrispThreat t) 
  { 
   occurances = t.occurances; 
   timespan = t.timespan; 
   severity_multiplier = t.severity_multiplier; 
   src_ip_frequency = t.src_ip_frequency; 
   avg_time_between = t.avg_time_between; 
   signature = t.signature; 
  } 
  #endregion 
 } 
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 public class CrispThreatCollection :  
System.Colle
 { 
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Add a CrispThreat to a Collection 
  /// </summar
  /// <param name="c"></param> 
  public virtual void Add(CrispThreat c) 
  { 
   this.List.Add(c); 
  } 
         
  /// <summary> 
  ///  Index a CrispThreat within a Collection 
  /// </summary> 
  public virtual CrispThreat this[int Index] 
  { 
   get 
   {return (CrispThreat)this.List[Index];} 





 #region Fuzzy Threat Objects (Fuzzy Threat,  
FuzzyThreatCollection) 
 
 /// <summary> 
 ///Same fields as CrispThreat Object, except values are doubles 
 /// </summary> 
 public struct FuzzyThreat 
 { 
  #region Properties 
   
  // ************************************* 
  //  HOLDS Y-VALUE OF MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION 
  // ************************************* 
  private double fuzz_occurances; 
  private double fuzz_timespan; 
  private double fuzz_severity_multiplier; 
  private double fuzz_src_ip_frequency; 
  private double fuzz_avg_time_between; 
   
 
  // ************************************* 
  //  HOLDS X-VALUE OF MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION 
  
  private C
 
  private int signature; 
 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Property Accessors 
   






  public CrispThreat crispThreat 
  { 
   get{return crisp;} 
  } 
   
  public double Occurances 
  { 
   get{return fuzz_occurances;} 
   set{fuzz_occurances = value;} 
  } 
  public double Timespan 
  { 
   get{return fuzz_timespan;} 
   set{ fuzz_timespan=value;} 
  } 
  public double Severity_Multiplier 
  { 
   get{return fuzz_severity_multiplier;} 
   set{ fuzz_severity_multiplier=value;} 
  } 
 
  public double Src_Ip_Frequency 
  { 
   get{return fuzz_src_ip_frequency;} 
   set{fuzz_src_ip_frequency=value;} 
  } 
  public double Avg_Time_Between 
  { 
   get{return fuzz_avg_time_between;} 
   set{fuzz_avg_time_between=value;} 
  } 
  public int Signature 
  { 
   get{return signature;} 
   set{signature=value;} 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
public FuzzyThreat(CrispThreat c,double 
fuzz_num_occurances, double fuzz_alert_avg_timespan, double 
fuzz_severity_mult, double 
fuzz_average_time_between_attacks, int alert_signature, 
double fuzz_source_ip_frequency) 
  { 
   fuzz_occurances = fuzz_num_occurances ; 
   fuzz_timespan = fuzz_alert_avg_timespan; 
   fuzz_severity_multiplier = fuzz_severity_mult; 
   fuzz_src_ip_frequency = fuzz_source_ip_frequency; 
   fuzz_avg_time_between =  
fuzz_average_time_between_attacks; 
   signature = alert_signature; 
 
   crisp = c; 
  } 
  public FuzzyThreat(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
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   fuzz_occurances = f.fuzz_occurances; 
   fuzz_timespan = f.fuzz_timespan; 
   fuzz_severity_multiplier =  
f.fuzz_severity_multiplier; 
   fuzz_avg_time_between = f.fuzz_avg_time_between; 
   signature = f.signature; 
   fuzz_src_ip_frequency = f.fuzz_src_ip_frequency; 
   crisp = f.crisp; 
  } 





 public class FuzzyThreatCollection :  
System.Collections.CollectionBase 
 { 
  public virtual void Add(FuzzyThreat c) 
  { 
   
  } 
         
  public virtual FuzzyThreat this[int Index] 
  { 
   get 
   {return (FuzzyThreat)this.List[Index];} 





 #region Fuzzy Threat Level Objects (FuzzyThreatLevel  
FuzzyThreatLevelCollection) 
  
 /// <summary> 
 /// All fuzzy metrics combined with a defuzzification method 
/// form a single value 
 /// </summary> 
 public struct FuzzyThreatLevel 
 { 
  #region Properties 
  
  double fuzzy_threat_level; 
  int signature; 
   
  #endregion 
 
  #region Property Accessors 
  public double Fuzzy_Threat_Level 
  { 
   get{return fuzzy_threat_level;} 
   set{fuzzy_threat_level = value;} 
  } 
  public int Signature 
  { 








  #region Constructors 
   
  public FuzzyThreatLevel(double threat_level, int sig) 
  { 
   fuzzy_threat_level = threat_level; 
   signature = sig; 
  } 
  public FuzzyThreatLevel(FuzzyThreatLevel f) 
  { 
   fuzzy_threat_level = f.fuzzy_threat_level; 
   signature = f.signature; 
  } 
 








  { 
   this.List.Add(c); 
  } 
         
  public virtual FuzzyThreatLevel this[int Index] 
  { 
   get 
   {return (FuzzyThreatLevel)this.List[Index];} 
  } 
  #region Methods 
 
  public System.Xml.XmlDocument CreateXML() 
  { 
   XmlElement signatureNode; 
   XmlElement fuzzyNode; 
   XmlText fuzzyText; 
    
   XmlDocument xmlDoc = new XmlDocument(); 
   XmlDeclaration xmlDeclaration =  
xmlDoc.CreateXmlDeclaration("1.0","utf-8",null);  
 
   // Create the root element 
   XmlElement rootNode  = xmlDoc.CreateElement("host"); 




   xmlDoc.InsertBefore(xmlDeclaration,  
xmlDoc.DocumentElement);  
  








   foreach(FuzzyThreatLevel ftl in this.InnerList) 
   { 
    // Create the <signature> element  
    signatureNode  =  
xmlDoc.CreateElement("signature"); 
 
    // Set attribute name and value 
    signatureNode.SetAttribute("sig",  
ftl.Signature.ToString()); 
   
 xmlDoc.DocumentElement.AppendChild(signatureNode); 
 
    // Create the Fuzzy Value Node 
    fuzzyNode  =  
xmlDoc.CreateElement("fuzzy_value"); 
    fuzzyText =  
xmlDoc.CreateTextNode(ftl.Fuzzy_Threat_Le 
vel.ToString()); 
    signatureNode.AppendChild(fuzzyNode); 
    fuzzyNode.AppendChild(fuzzyText); 
   } 
 
   // Save to the XML file 
   xmlDoc.Save( "a.xml"); 
   return xmlDoc; 
  } 
   
 















 /// <summary> 
 /// Specific Set of Membership Functions for the application 
 /// </summary> 
 public class FuzzificationMembershipFunction : IFuzzification 
 { 
  #region Properties 
   
  public FuzzyThreatCollection fuzzyThreats = new  
FuzzyThreatCollection(); 
   
  #endregion 
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  #region Constructors 
   
  public  
FuzzificationMembershipFunction(CrispThreatCollection i) 
  { 
   fuzzyThreats = MakeFuzzy(i); 
 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region IFuzzification Members 
   
  public FuzzyThreatCollection GetFuzzyThreats() 
  { 
   return fuzzyThreats; 
  } 
 
  public FuzzyThreatCollection  
MakeFuzzy(CrispThreatCollection i) 
  { 
   FuzzyThreat f; 
   foreach(CrispThreat t in i) 
   { 
    f = new FuzzyThreat(MakeFuzzy(t)); 
    fuzzyThreats.Add(f); 
   } 
   return fuzzyThreats; 
  } 
 
  public FuzzyThreat MakeFuzzy(CrispThreat c) 
  { 
   double fuzz_occurances =  
this.MembershipOccurances(c.Occurances); 
   double fuzz_timespan   =  
this.MembershipTimespan(c.Timespan); 
   double fuzz_severity_multiplier  =  
this.MembershipSeverity(c.Severity_Multiplier); 
   double fuzz_avg_time_between     =  
this.MembershipTimeBetween(c.Avg_Time_Between); 
   double fuzz_source_ip_frequency =   
this.MembershipSrcIPFreq(c.Src_Ip_Frequency); 






  }   
  #endregion 
 
  #region Helper (Private) Methods 
  private double MembershipOccurances(int occurances) 
  { 
   double [,] points = new double[11,2]; 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;   points[0,1] = .0; 
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   points[1,0] = 10;  points[1,1] = .05; 
   points[2,0] = 20;  points[2,1] = .1; 
   points[3,0] = 25;  points[3,1] = .14; 
   points[4,0] = 30;  points[4,1] = .2; 
   points[5,0] = 38;  points[5,1] = .3; 
   points[6,0] = 43;  points[6,1] = .32; 
   points[7,0] = 50;  points[7,1] = .35; 
   points[8,0] = 80;  points[8,1] = .35; 
   points[9,0] = 100; points[9,1] = 1; 
   points[10,0] = double.PositiveInfinity ;  
points[10,1] = 1; 
   
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(occurances); 
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipTimespan(TimeSpan t) 
  { 
    
   // OLD: [[0,1],[172800,.2],[172800*2,1],[infinity,1]] 
   // NEW: [[0,1],[172800*2,.2],[infinity,.2]] 
    
   double [,] points = new double[3,2]; 
   points[0,0] = 0;   points[0,1] = 1; 
   points[1,0] = 172800*2;  points[1,1] = .2; 
   points[2,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;  points[2,1] =  
.2; 
    
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(t.TotalSeconds); 
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipSeverity(int s) 
  { 
   return 1; 
  } 
  private double MembershipTimeBetween(TimeSpan t) 
  {  
    
   double [,] points = new double[6,2]; 
   points[0,0] = 0;       points[0,1] = 1; 
   points[1,0] = 3600;    points[1,1] = 1; 
   points[2,0] = 86400;   points[2,1] = .2; 
   points[3,0] = 172800;  points[3,1] = .2; 
   points[4,0] = 432000;  points[4,1] = 1; 
   points[5,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;   
points[5,1] = 1; 
 
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(t.TotalSeconds); 
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipSrcIPFreq(double ip_fre) 
  {  
    
   double [,] points = new double[11,2]; 
   // MAPLE - set of points 
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   // [0,0],[10,0],[10,.2],[25,.2],[25,.5],[80,.5], 
   // [80,.8],[100,.8],[100,1],[150,1],[infinity,1] 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;   points[0,1] = 0; 
   points[1,0] = 10;  points[1,1] = 0; 
   points[2,0] = 10;  points[2,1] = .2; 
   points[3,0] = 25;  points[3,1] = .2; 
   points[4,0] = 25;  points[4,1] = .5; 
   points[5,0] = 80;  points[5,1] = .5; 
   points[6,0] = 80;  points[6,1] = .8; 
   points[7,0] = 100; points[7,1] = .8; 
   points[8,0] = 100; points[8,1] = 1; 
   points[9,0] = 150; points[9,1] = 1; 
   points[10,0] = double.PositiveInfinity ;  
points[10,1] = 1; 
   
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(ip_fre); 
   return fuzz;   
  } 
 
   
/// <summary> 
///  For testing purposes only 
/// </summary> 
/// <returns>a random number in the set [0,.25,.5,.75,1]</returns> 
  private double R() 
  { 
   System.Random r = new Random(); 
   int temp = r.Next(1,5); 
   if(temp == 1) 
    return 0.0; 
   else if(temp == 2) 
    return 0.25; 
   else if(temp == 3) 
    return 0.5; 
   else if(temp == 4) 
    return 0.75; 
   return 1.0; 
  } 












 /// <summary> 
 ///  General Set of Membership Functions for the 
Application 
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 /// </summary> 
 public class GeneralMembership : IFuzzification 
 { 
  #region Properties 
   
  public FuzzyThreatCollection fuzzyThreats = new  
FuzzyThreatCollection(); 
   
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
   
  public GeneralMembership(CrispThreatCollection i) 
  { 
   fuzzyThreats = MakeFuzzy(i); 
  } 
 
  #endregion 
   
  #region IFuzzification Members 
 
  public FuzzyThreatCollection  
MakeFuzzy(CrispThreatCollection i) 
  { 
   FuzzyThreat f; 
   foreach(CrispThreat t in i) 
   { 
    f = new FuzzyThreat(MakeFuzzy(t)); 
    fuzzyThreats.Add(f); 
   } 
   return fuzzyThreats; 
  } 
 
  public FuzzyThreat MakeFuzzy(CrispThreat c) 
  { 
   double fuzz_occurances =  
this.MembershipOccurances(c.Occurances); 
   double fuzz_timespan   =  
this.MembershipTimespan(c.Timespan); 
   double fuzz_severity_multiplier  =  
this.MembershipSeverity(c.Severity_Multiplier); 
   double fuzz_avg_time_between     =  
this.MembershipTimeBetween(c.Avg_Time_Between); 
   double fuzz_source_ip_frequency =   
this.MembershipSrcIPFreq(c.Src_Ip_Frequency); 











  public FuzzyThreatCollect
  { 
   return fuzzyThreats; 
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  } 
 
 
#region Helper (Private) Methods 
 double fuzz = f.solve(t.TotalSeconds); 
 points[1,0] = 172800/2; points[1,1] = .8; 





  private double MembershipOccurances(int occurances) 
  {  
   double [,] points = new double[3,2]; 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;   points[0,1] = .1; 
   points[1,0] = 10; points[1,1] = .8; 
   points[2,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;     
points[2,1] = .8; 
   
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(occurances); 
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipTimespan(TimeSpan t) 
  { 
   double [,] points = new double[3,2]; 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;  points[0,1] = .1; 
   points[1,0] = 172800; points[1,1] = .8; 
   points[2,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;    
points[2,1] = .8; 
   
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
  
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipSeverity(int s) 
  { 
   return 1; 
  } 
  private double MembershipTimeBetween(TimeSpan t) 
  {  
   double [,] points = new double[3,2]; 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;  points[0,1] = .1; 
  
   points[2,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;     
points[2,1] = .8; 
   
   IMath f = new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(t.TotalSeconds); 
   return fuzz; 
  } 
  private double MembershipSrcIPFreq(double ip_fre) 
  {     
   double [,] points = new double[3,2]; 
 
   points[0,0] = 0;  points[0,1] = .1; 
   points[1,0] = 6; points[1,1] = .8; 
   points[2,0] = double.PositiveInfinity;     
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   IMath new SetOfPointsFunction(points); 
   double fuzz = f.solve(ip_fre); 
   return fuzz;  
  } 
 
   





 public class RuleBase 
 { 
  protected const double startlow  = .2; 
  protected const double startmed  = .5; 
  protected const double starthigh = .7; 
 
  protected double CheckBounds(double a) 
  { 
  
  
  ) 
    return 0; 
   else 
   
  } 
  protected bool IsNone(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 
   if(FuzzyValue == 0) 
  
  
  } 
  protected bool IsLow(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 
   if(FuzzyValue <= .33 && FuzzyValue > 0) 
    return true; 
   return false; 
  
  d(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 
   if(FuzzyValue <= .66 && FuzzyValue > .33) 
    return true; 
   return false; 
  } 
  protected bool IsHigh(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 
   if(FuzzyValue <= .99 && FuzzyValue > .66) 
    return true; 
   return false; 
  } 






 if( a > 1) 
  return 1; 
 else if( a < 0
 return a; 
  return true; 




 if(FuzzyValue == 1.0) 
  return true; 
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   return false; 
  } 
  protected bool IsMedHigh(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 
   if(this.IsHigh(FuzzyValue) || this.IsMed(FuzzyValue)) 
    return true; 
   return false; 
  } 
  protected bool IsLowMed(double FuzzyValue) 
  { 













 public class Rules : RuleBase, IRule 
 { 
   
  public Rules() 




  { 
   double ftl = 0.0; 
   #region Signature Switch 
   switch(f.Signature) 
   { 
    case 1671:     //'WEB-MISC /home/www access' 
     ftl = this.WEB_MISC_ACCESS(f); 
     break; 
    case 15: 
     ftl =  
this.HTTP_INSPECT_OVERSIZE_REQUEST(f); 
     break; 
    case 4: 






     break; 
    case 1113: 
if(this.IsLow(FuzzyValue) || this.IsMed(FuzzyValue)) 
   return true; 
  return false; 
 } 
 
#region IRule Members 
 
public double FindFuzzyThreatLevel(FuzzyThreat f) 
   break; 
  case 1112: 




     break; 
    case 882: 
     ftl = this.WEB_CGI_CALENDAR_ACCESS(f); 
     break;     
    case 16: 
     ftl =  
this.HTTP_INSPECT_OVERSIZE_CHUNK_ENCODING(f); 
     break; 
    case 2: 
     ftl =  
this.HTTP_INSPECT_DOUBLE_DECODING_ATTACK(f); 
     break;     
  
  (f); 
     break;     
    case 3813: 
     ftl = this.WEB_CGI_COMMAND_EXECUTION(f); 
     break; 
    case 3463: 
     ftl = this.WEB_CGI_AWSTATS_ACCESS(f); 
     break;     
    case 1070: 
     ftl = this.WEB_MISC_WEBDAV_SEARCH(f); 
     break; 
    case 1807: 
ftl = 
this.WEB_MISC_CHUNKED_ENCODING_TRANSFER(f); 
     break; 
    case 1248: 





     break; 
    case 1002: 
     ftl = this.WEB_IIS_CMD_ACCESS(f); 
     break;     
    case 2570: 
ftl = 
this.WEB_MISC_INVALID_HTTP_VERSION_STRING(f); 
     break; 
    default: 
     ftl = -1.0; 
     break; 
   } 
   #endregion 
   return ftl; 
  
  #endregion 
  Signature 
  /* 
    f.Occurances;   
    f.Timespan; 
    f.Avg_Time_Between;  (timespan / occurances) 
    f.Src_Ip_Frequency;  (# IPs    / occurnaces 
  case 1852: 
   ftl = this.WEB_MISC_ROBOTS_ACCESS
   ftl = this.WEB_FRONTPAGE_DLL_AC
   break; 





     
   */ 
 




  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) &&  
this.IsLow(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .5; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) &&  
!this.IsLow(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .2; 
   
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Timespan)) 
    threat -= .2; 
 
  
    threat -= .1; 
 
   threat = CheckBounds(threat); 
 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
   
  //'(http_inspect) OVERSIZE REQUEST-URI DIRECTORY' (15) 
  private double HTTP_INSPECT_OVERSIZE_REQUEST(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Occurances)) 
    threat += threat*2; 
   if(this.IsLow(f.Timespan)) 
    threat -= .2; 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
  //'(http_inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING' (4) 
  private double HTTP_INPECT_BB_UNICODE_ENCODING(FuzzyThreat 
f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
  
   if(
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat -= .1; 
 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   
  } 
 
  //'WEB-MISC http directory traversal' (1112) 
// http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1671 
// Low threat 






  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1112 
  // Low Threat 
  private double WEB_MISC_DIRECTORY_TRAVERSAL(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
    
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Occurances)) 
    threat += .3; 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Occurances)) 
    threat += .1; 
 
   if(this.IsLow(f.Src_Ip_Frequency))     
    threat -= .2; 




   threat = CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
   
  //'WEB-CGI calendar access' 
  // htt
  // Low
  privat B_CGI_CALENDAR_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   // This application does not exist on our system 
   return 0.0; 
  } 
 
   
  //'(http_inspect) OVERSIZE CHUNK ENCODING' 
  // Unknown Threat 
  private double 
HTTP_INSPECT_OVERSIZE_CHUNK_ENCODING(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   
  } 
 
  //'(http_inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK' 
  // Unknown Threat 
  private double 
HTTP_INSPECT_DOUBLE_DECODING_ATTACK(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Occurances)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsLow(f.Timespan)) 
    threat -= .2; 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
  //'WEB-MISC robots.txt access' 
  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1852 
  // Low Threat 
  threat += .3; 
p://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=882 




  private double WEB_MISC_ROBOTS_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat -= .1; 
   return threat; 
  } 
  
 
 //'WE-CGI awstats.pl configdir command execution attempt' (3813) 
 // http://www.nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=16189 
 // High Threat  
  private double WEB_CGI_COMMAND_EXECUTION(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = starthigh; 
  
    
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Timespan)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Occurances)) 
   
 
 
   threat = CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-CGI awstats access' (3463) 
  // 
http://www.nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=16456 
  // High Threat 
  private double WEB_CGI_AWSTATS_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = starthigh; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .1; 
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Timespan)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Occurances)) 
    threat += .3; 
 
   threat = CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-MISC WebDAV search access' (1070) 
  // ttp://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1070 
  // d
  pri t
  { 
   double threat = startmed; 
   // Possible DOS for unpatched (out of the box) WebDAV 
Service 
 if(this.IsHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
threat += .1; 
 threat += .3; 
h
Me ium Threat 
va e double WEB_MISC_WEBDAV_SEARCH(FuzzyThreat f) 
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   if(this.IsHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .1; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat += .1; 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Occurances)) 
    threat -= .2; 
 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-MISC Chunked-Encoding transfer attempt' (1807) 
  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1807 
  // Medium Threat 
  private double 
WEB_MISC_CHUNKED_ENCODING_TRANSFER(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startmed; 
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Avg_Time_Between)) 
    threat += .1; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
+= .1; 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat;   
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-FRONTPAGE rad fp30reg.dll access' (1248) 
  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1248 
  // Medium Threat 
  private double WEB_FRONTPAGE_DLL_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startmed; 
 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Occurances)) 
  
  
    threat -= .1; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat += .2; 
 
  
   re
  } 
 
   
  //'WEB-FRONTPAGE /_vti_bin/ access' (1288) 
  // 
http://www.nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=11032 
  // Low threat 
  private double WEB_FRONTPAGE_VTI_BIN_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat += .2; 
    threat 
 
  threat += .1; 
 if(this.IsLowMed(f.Occurances)) 
 threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
turn threat; 
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   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-IIS cmd.exe access' (1002) 
  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=1002 
  private double WEB_IIS_CMD_ACCESS(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startlow; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Timespan)) 
    threat -= .1; 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 
 
  //'WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String' (2570) 
  // http://www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid=2570 
  // High Threat 
  private double 
WEB_MISC_INVALID_HTTP_VERSION_STRING(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = starthigh; 
   if(this.IsMedHigh(f.Src_Ip_Frequency)) 
    threat += .2; 
   if(this.IsHigh(f.Timespan)) 
    threat += .1; 
   threat = this.CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 
  } 
 










 /// <summary> 
 ///  General Set of Rules for the application 
 /// </summary> 
 public class GeneralRules : RuleBase, IRule 
 { 
  public GeneralRules() 
  { 
   //  
   // TODO: Add constructor logic here 
   // 
  } 
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  #region IRule Members 
 
  public double FindFuzzyThreatLevel(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double ftl = 0.0; 
   ftl = GRule(f); 
   return ftl; 
  } 
 
  #endregion 
 
  private double GRule(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   double threat = startmed; 
 
  // If anything is a high threat, elevate the threat level 




     
threat += .1; 
 
// If a lot of different IPs are doing it in a low 




    threat += .5; 
 
// If a lot of different IPs are doing over a large 




    threat += .2; 
// If not a lot of people are doing it over not a lot 
// of time, decrement the threat level 
if(this.IsLowMed(f.Src_Ip_Frequency) && 
this.IsLow(f.Timespan)) 
    threat -= .3; 
 
 
   // If not happening a lot, decrement the threat level 
   if(this.IsLowMed(f.Occurances)) 
    threat -= .1; 
 
   threat = CheckBounds(threat); 
   return threat; 

















 /// <summary> 
 ///The main Wrapper for fuzzy Logic Operations...a starting point 
 public class FuzzyEngine 
 { 
/// <summary> 
  ///  Finds a Threat Level for a host (sensor) 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <returns>The threat level for the sensor</returns> 
  public static double HostThreatLevel(DataSet ds,  
System.Windows.Forms.ListBox l) 
  { 
   XmlDocument xmlDoc = new XmlDocument(); 
 
   SnortAdapter s = new SnortAdapter(ds); 
   CrispThreatCollection c1 = s.CrispThreats; 
    
   IFuzzification f = new       
   FuzzificationMembershipFunction(c1); 
   FuzzyThreatCollection f1 = f.GetFuzzyThreats(); 
 
   IRule r = new Rules();  
   IInferenceEngine i = new RuleBasedInference(f1,r); 
   FuzzyThreatLevelCollection f2 =  
i.GetFuzzyThreatLevel(); 
    
   xmlDoc = f2.CreateXML(); 
   FormatLog(xmlDoc, l); 
 
   IDefuzzifier MeanOfMaximum = new MOMDefuzzify(f2); 
   double o = MeanOfMaximum.GetCrispOutput(); 
   return o; 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Basic Logging Function to show specific steps of the  
/// application to the GUI 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="xmldoc"></param> 










 /// </summary> 
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  /// <returns></returns> 
  private static string FormatLog(XmlDocument xmldoc, 
System.Windows.Forms.ListBox l) 
  { 
    
   l.Items.Clear(); 
   XmlNodeList xmlnode =  
xmldoc.GetElementsByTagName("signature"); 
   string s = ""; 
   
   for(int i=0;i<xmlnode.Count;i++) 
   { 
    XmlAttributeCollection xmlattrc =  
xmlnode[i].Attributes; 
l.Items.Add(xmlnode[i].FirstChild.Name + ": "+ 
xmlnode[i].FirstChild.InnerText + " -> " + 
arf.ARF_Main.GetSnortSignatureName(xmlattrc[0].
Value) + " |" + xmlattrc[0].Value + "|"); 
   } 
 
   return s; 














 /// <summary> 
 /// Creates a CrispThreat object based on a common snort event  
/// log dataset 
 /// </summary> 
 public class SnortAdapter 
 { 
  private ArrayList dataRows = new ArrayList();   
// An arraylist of (DataRow []) objects 
  private DataSet hostAlerts; 
  private CrispThreatCollection crispThreats = new  
CrispThreatCollection(); 
 
  public CrispThreatCollection CrispThreats 
  { 
   get{return crispThreats;} 
  } 
 
  public SnortAdapter(DataSet HostAlerts) 
  { 




   hostAlerts = HostAlerts; 
   DataRow [] AllDataRows; 
   DataRow [] SortedSignatureRows; 
   int [] signatures; 
   int UniqueSignatures = 0; 
   
   DataTable d = CreateEventTable(); 
   DataTable temp; 
   d = HostAlerts.Tables["Table"]; 
     
   AllDataRows = d.Select("0=0","signature desc"); 
   temp = SelectDistinct("event",d,"signature"); 
   UniqueSignatures = temp.Rows.Count; 
   signatures = new int[UniqueSignatures]; 
    
   for(int i = 0; i <temp.Rows.Count; i++) 
   { 
    signatures[i] =  
Parse(temp.Rows[i].ItemArray[0].ToString()); 
   } 
 
   for(int i = 0; i < UniqueSignatures; i++) 
   { 
    SortedSignatureRows = d.Select("signature = " +  
signatures[i].ToString()); 
    SortedDataRows.Add(SortedSignatureRows); 
   } 
   
   CrispThreat c; 
   for(int i = 0; i < SortedDataRows.Count; i++) 
   { 
  t(CalculateThreat((DataRow  
[])SortedDataRows[i])); 
    crispThreats.Add(c); 
   } 
 
   
  } 
  
   
  private CrispThreat CalculateThreat(DataRow [] d)   
    
   int occurances = d.Length; 
   System.TimeSpan t; 
   System.TimeSpan a; 
 
   System.DateTime first = new DateTime(1); 
   System.DateTime last = new DateTime(1); 
   bool IsFirstIteration = true; 
   double avg = 0.0; 
   string signature = ""; 
   ArrayList IPs = new ArrayList(); 
   int UniqueIP = 0; 
   double ip_per_alert = 0.0; 
    
   System.DateTime current; 
   foreach(DataRow r in d) 
  c = new CrispThrea
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   { 
    current =  
DateTime.Parse(r.ItemArray[2].ToString(); 
    if(IsFirstIteration) 
    { 
     first = current; 
     last  = current; 
     signature = r.ItemArray[3].ToString(); 
    } 
    if(current < first && !IsFirstIteration) 
     first = current; 
    if(current > last && !IsFirstIteration) 
     last = current; 
     
    IsFirstIteration = false; 
 
    // Find unique IP's 
    if(!IPs.Contains(r.ItemArray[5])) 
     IPs.Add(r.ItemArray[5]); 
 
   } 
   t = last.Subtract(first); 
   avg = t.TotalSeconds/(double)occurances; 
   a = new TimeSpan(0,0,(int)avg); 
   UniqueIP = IPs.Count; 
   ip_per_alert = (double)occurances / (double)UniqueIP; 
    
CrispThreat c = new 
CrispThreat(occurances,t,SeverityFinder(signature),a,
int.Parse(signature),ip_per_alert); 
   return c; 
 
  } 
   
  #region Private (Helper Functions) 
  //copied from 
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;326176 
  public DataTable SelectDistinct(string TableName, DataTable 
SourceTable, string FieldName) 
  { 
   DataTable dt = new DataTable(TableName); 
   dt.Columns.Add(FieldName, 
SourceTable.Columns[FieldName].DataType); 
 
   object LastValue = null; 
   foreach (DataRow dr in SourceTable.Select("", 
FieldName)) 
   { 
    if (  LastValue == null || 
!(ColumnEqual(LastValue, dr[FieldName])) ) 
    { 
     LastValue = dr[FieldName]; 
     dt.Rows.Add(new object[]{LastValue}); 
    } 
   } 
   if (hostAlerts != null) 
    hostAlerts.Tables.Add(dt); 
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   return dt; 
  } 
   
  //copied from 
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;326176 
  private bool ColumnEqual(object A, object B) 
  { 
 
   // Compares two values to see if they are equal. Also 
compares DBNULL.Value. 
   // Note: If your DataTable contains object fields, 
then you must extend this 
   // function to handle them in a meaningful way if you 
intend to group on them. 
 
   if ( A == DBNull.Value && B == DBNull.Value ) //  
both are DBNull.Value 
    return true; 
   if ( A == DBNull.Value || B == DBNull.Value ) //  
only one is DBNull.Value 
    return false; 
   return ( A.Equals(B) );  // value type standard 
comparison 
  } 
   
  private DataTable CreateEventTable() 
  { 
   DataTable dt = new DataTable("event"); 
    
   DataColumn dc = new  
DataColumn("sid",System.Type.GetType("System.Int32")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   dc = new 
DataColumn("cid",System.Type.GetType("System.Int32")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   dc = new 
DataColumn("signature",System.Type.GetType("System.Int32")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   dc = new 
DataColumn("timestamp",System.Type.GetType("System.DateTime")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   dc = new 
DataColumn("sensor_alias",System.Type.GetType("System.String")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   dc = new 
DataColumn("ip_src",System.Type.GetType("System.String")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
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   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
    
   dc = new 
DataColumn("ip_dest",System.Type.GetType("System.String")); 
   dc.AllowDBNull = false; 
   dt.Columns.Add(dc); 
 
   return dt; 
  } 
  private int SeverityFinder(string signature) 
  { 
   return 1; 
  } 












 /// <summary> 
 ///  Maps the ruleset to a signature 
 /// </summary> 
 public class RuleBasedInference : IInferenceEngine 
 { 
  #region Properties 
   
  private FuzzyThreatLevelCollection fuzzyThreatLevels = new  
FuzzyThreatLevelCollection(); 
  private IRule r; 
  #endregion 
 
  public RuleBasedInference(FuzzyThreatCollection f, IRule  
RuleSet) 
  { 
   r = RuleSet; 
   fuzzyThreatLevels = FuzzyInference(f); 
   
  } 
 
  #region IInferenceEngine Members 
 
  public FuzzyThreatLevelCollection  
FuzzyInference(FuzzyThreatCollection i) 
  { 
   FuzzyThreatLevel ftl; 
   foreach(FuzzyThreat t in i) 
   { 
    ftl = new FuzzyThreatLevel(FuzzyInference(t)); 
    fuzzyThreatLevels.Add(ftl); 
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   } 
   return fuzzyThreatLevels; 
  } 
 
  public FuzzyThreatLevel FuzzyInference(FuzzyThreat f) 
  { 
   FuzzyThreatLevel ftl = new  
FuzzyThreatLevel(r.FindFuzzyThreatLevel(f),f.Signature); 
   return ftl; 
  } 
 
  public FuzzyThreatLevelCollection GetFuzzyThreatLevel() 
  { 
   return fuzzyThreatLevels; 
  } 
 












 /// <summary> 
 ///    Mean of Maximum Defuzzifier 
 /// </summary> 
 public class MOMDefuzzify : IDefuzzifier 
 { 
  double output; 
 
  public MOMDefuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i) 
  { 
    output = Defuzzify(i); 
  } 
 
  #region IDefuzzifier Members 
 
  public double GetCrispOutput() 
  { 
   return output; 
  } 
 
  public double Defuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i) 
  { 
   int    count = 0; 
   double dValue= 0.0; 
   foreach(FuzzyThreatLevel t in i) 
   { 
    count++; 
    dValue += t.Fuzzy_Threat_Level; 
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   } 
   return dValue/(double)count; 
  } 
 
 











 /// <summary> 
 ///  Returns the Maximum Fuzzy value 
 /// </summary> 
 public class MaxDefuzzify : IDefuzzifier 
 { 
  double output; 
  public MaxDefuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i) 
  { 
   output = Defuzzify(i); 
  } 
  #region IDefuzzifier Members 
 
  public double Defuzzify(FuzzyThreatLevelCollection i) 
  { 
   double largest = 0.0; 
 
   foreach(FuzzyThreatLevel t in i) 
   { 
    if(t.Fuzzy_Threat_Level > largest) 
     largest = t.Fuzzy_Threat_Level; 
   } 
   return largest; 
  } 
 
  public double GetCrispOutput() 
  { 
   return output; 
  } 
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